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The Law Clerks: Profile of an 
Institution* 
Paul R. Baier** 
The law is not made by judge alone, but by judge and 
company. -Jeremy Bentham 
l. INTRODUCTION 
Every ten years or so someone in the literature writes about the 
law clerks. In the fifties, a flurry of articles appeared in US. News 
& World Report and in the New York Times focusing on law clerks 
who serve Justices of the United States Supreme Court.1 The ques­
tions considered were whether these clerks were a "second team," 
and whether, as a result, the opinions of the Court were really only 
the apocrypha of the law clerks. If so, shouldn't this otherwise un­
noticed influence be exposed and condemned? A recent appointee 
to the United States Supreme Court and former clerk himself, Jus­
tice William Rehnquist, was a principal in the effort, arguing under 
the title "Who Writes Decisions of the Supreme Court?" that clerk­
ship "influence" did exist, particularly on the Court's handling of 
petitions for certiorari, and that "because of the political outlook of 
the group of clerks that I knew, its direction would be to the political 
'left.' "2 Several articles were written rebutting these allegations, all 
* This paper was read as the invocation address at the first Law Clerk Institute, Louisi­
ana State University Law Center, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Aug. 30 to Sept. 1, 1972. The 
Institute is sponsored by the Appellate Judges Conference of the Division of Judicial Adminis­
tration of the American Bar Association and by the Louisiana State University Law School. 
The program is now an annual event. The second Institute was held this past August 
again at Louisiana State University, and several contributors to this symposium issue partici­
pated as faculty, including Professor Baier, Justice Robert Braucher, Chief Judge Lesinski, 
and Judge Eugene Wright. 
** Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law School. A.B., 1966, 
University of Cincinnati; J.D., 1969, Harvard University. 
1. See, e.g., The Bright Young Men Behind the Bench, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, 
July 12, 1957, at 45. 
2. Rehnquist, Who Writes Decisions of the Supreme Court?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REPORT, Dec. 13, 1957, at 74, 75. See also Justice Tom Clark's observation in Internal Opera­
tion of the United States Supreme Court, 43 J. AM. Juo. Soc'v 45, 48 (1959), quoting Justice 
Robert Jackson: 
A suspicion has grown at the bar that the law clerks . . constitute a kind of junior 
court which decides the fate of the certiorari petitions. This idea of the law clerk's 
influence gave rise to a lawyer's waggish statement that the Senate no longer need bother 
about confirmation of justices but ought to confirm the appointment of law clerks. 
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authored by equally distinguished men and former clerks to Justices 
of the Supreme Court. 
William Rogers, who once clerked for Justice Reed, wrote that 
during his service he never witnessed a law clerk exercising any 
substantial influence on the decision making of the Justices. It was 
Rogers's thesis that because the duties of the clerks were often on 
the technical rather than the policy side of j udgment, undue influ­
ence was improbable: 
The law clerks perform the drudgery of judging-looking up citations. examin­
ing old cases for apt quotations, general research. This liberates the .Just ices 
for their own important work. Theirs is the ultimate responsibility to decide 
and vote yea or nay on each case. And this vote is cast in secret conference of 
the Justices, from which the law clerks are rigorously barred." 
A different point, but one still in rebuttal, was that of Professor 
Alexander Bickel of the Yale Law School. Analyz ing the charge of 
influence, Professor Bickel's response was to concede it, but only 
after carefully detailing the "larger function" of the law clerk, a 
function that includes more than just running the research errands. 
In Bickel's depiction, the law clerk is the young intellectual collabo­
rator, fulfilling Bentham's dictum, "the law is not made by judge 
alone, but by judge and company." Properly understood, the law 
clerk's contribution-even if labeled "influence"-is toward en­
hancement of the intellectual integrity of the judicial process. The 
clerkship, according to Bickel, "is in its modest way one of the 
influences that keep judicial law rationally responsive to the needs 
of the day."� 
No doubt the delegation issue makes for colorful journalism. 
Indeed, it provides a nice beginning here too, for hopefully you are 
now on the edge of your seat willing to listen to me further. I should 
think if anything can pique your legal ears at the outset, it is the 
thought that for the ensuing year you will find yourself acting, de 
facto, as a jurist. But all of this must await later discussion. There 
is first the need to detail just what it is the law clerks do. We then 
will be in a better position to see how the clerk's duties measure up 
against traditional notions of the judicial function . We need not 
wholly abandon the delegation issue, however, to find an appropri-
3. Rogers, Do Law Clerks Wield Power in Supreme Court Cases?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REPORT, Feb. 21, 1958, at 1 14, 116. 
. 
4. Bickel, The Court: An Indictment Analyzed, N .Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1958, § 6 (Maga­
zine). at 16, 69. Judge Samuel H. Hofstadter commented on this article in a letter to the 
Tim<'8. N.Y. Times, May 18, 1958, § 6 (Magazine), at 4. Professor Bickel had earlier pub­
h�hed an account of the law clerks in his book, POLITICS AND THEW ARREN COURT 139-45 (1955). 
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ate beginning, a sort of theme for the remarks that follow. Mr. 
Justice Rehnquist concluded his rejoinder to the good Professor 
Bickel and Mr. Rogers with this paragraph: 
The resolution of these disagreements must await a thorough, impartial 
study of t he matter by someone who is not personally involved. Meanwhile, 
every expression of a point of view by someone who was on the scene, even in 
as small a way as we were, is bound to contribute to a better understanding of 
this phase of the judicial process.5 
Under the terms of my charge at this first Law Clerk Institute 
I am supposed to sketch the history of the clerkship institution, the 
duties generally associated with the task of clerking, and the im­
portance of the position in judicial administration. I will also add 
something of my own about the discoveries you can expect to make, 
and retain for yourselves, as fledgling participants in the judicial 
process. Where appropriate I plan to season my observations with 
personal recollections drawn from my own clerkship experience-no 
doubt to an excess, but I simply can't resist the opportunity. 
I speak to you as fellow law clerk, but unlike you who have it 
all to anticipate, I must look back almost three years to reflect again 
on my clerking days. It was my good fortune to clerk for Judge John 
H. Gillis at the Michigan Court of Appeals, the intermediate, work­
horse appellate level in Michigan. Although this was not work for 
any status court, the job was clerking nonetheless. Out of the experi­
ence was born my present interest in the judicial process generally 
and in the law clerkship as aid to that process. It was at the Michi­
gan Court of Appeals that I first met T. John Lesinski, Chief Judge 
of the court and official consultant to this Institute.6 Judge Lesinski 
first mentioned the idea of a workshop for prospective clerks before 
they begin their tenure. 7 He also suggested that there should be a 
manual on clerking available for use in both state and federal courts 
across the country.8 I always thought these ideas were sound ones, 
especially since it was not until midyear in my clerkship-perhaps 
not until the very end-that I first felt secure as a clerk and knowl-
5. Rehnquist, Another View: Clerk.� Might "lnffuence" Some Actions, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REPORT, Feb. 21, 1958, at 116. 
6. .Judge Lesinski is currently Chairman of the Appellate Judges Conference. Sect ion 
of .Judicial Administration of the American Bar Association. 
7. The origin of the idea and the planning for the first Law Clerk Institute is recounted 
more fully in the Appendix to this article. 
R. The Law Clerk Institute has begun preparation of such a manu
al. All clerks nttend­
ing the first program were asked to bring with them whatever written instruc�ions t h<'Y hnd · 
· 
· 
· h · I k h' F m these and other mform1111on lo received from their court on beginning t e1r c er s 1p. ro 
he collected it is hoped a comprehensive manual on law clerkin� will result. 
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edgeable in the "art" of law clerking. The word is chosen intention­
ally. The ropes of clerking are hard enough to learn without the 
added burden of approaching the task in ignorance. Yet the tradi­
tional approach-the casual suggestion to the novitiate to "take a 
crack at it"9-hardly seems fit to nurture sound performance of the 
job from the start. I remember thinking near the end of my stay how 
strange that I should leave the court with-to use a former law 
professor's phrase-the eagles perched on my shoulders, only to 
make room for my purblind successor. 
In the view of its planners, this Institute offers a real chance to 
improve the performance of the clerkship function. My efforts at 
description of the clerkship institution are only the first in a pro­
gram designed to immerse you in the process of law clerking, as is 
apparent from the Institute's prospectus.1° The end in view is the 
important one of getting the job of clerking done at the next term 
of appellate courts throughout the nation more efficiently than at 
the last. The goal is to provide guidance at the outset, rather than 
allowing experience to serve as exclusive tutor .11 Our expectations 
are not grandiose. We only hope to send next year's clerks to the 
business of clerking knowing from the start something about the 
tasks ahead and how best to accomplish them. 
I cannot resist one final introductory remark. I have it on the 
best authority, indeed from the Justice himself, that despite his 
earlier criticisms of the law clerks, Mr. Justice Rehnquist now em­
ploys the maximum allotment of three. And each prepares memo­
randa on certiorari petitions and assists in the drafting of opinions.12 
It appears there is no escape from resort to the clerkship institution 
in aid of the judicial process whenever the press of the case load 
leans heavily on the judge. 
II. UP FROM "SECRETARY": THE HISTORY AND ETIOLOGY OF THE 
CLERKSHIP INSTITUTION 
We begin with the calmer, less colorful historical question: 
9. Brudney & Wolfson, Mr. Justice Rutledge-Law Clerks' Refiections, 25 IND. L.J. 455, 
456 (1949). I received similarly limited instructions as Judge Gillis's clerk. He simply called 
me into chambers, handed me the file containing the briefs on appeal, directed me to the 
record in the case, and said that I was to prepare a draft opinion by the end of the week. 
10. For its content and the curriculum of the first Law Clerk Institute see the Appendix 
to this article. 
11. Typically, "lwlhen the law clerk first assumes his duties, much time is spent 
developing the skills necessary for the job." Fite, Law Clerkships-Three Inside Views, 33 
AI.A. LAW. 155. 157 (1972). 
12. I...etter from .Justice William Rehnquist to Paul R. Baier, Aug. 24, 1972. 
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When and where did the law clerk originate? Why has the office 
acquired its present institutional status? What accounts for the 
importance of the institution to judicial administration? 
Most of what is known about the history of law clerks, at least 
those serving the United States Supreme Court, was traced during 
the nineteen sixties by Chester Newland, a political scientist and 
student of the Supreme Court. Professor Newland's article "Per­
sonal Assistants to Supreme Court Justices: The Law Clerks," pub­
lished in the Oregon Law Review in 1961, 13 represents that decade's 
most comprehensive study of the clerkship as an important aspect 
of the judicial process in our nation's foremost tribunal. Perhaps 
unwittingly, the article represents a scholarly response to Mr. Jus­
tice Rehnquist's earlier call for an impartial study of the clerkship 
institution.1t However, as is almost universally true of the various 
surveys of the law clerks, Professor Newland's work is confined to 
tracing the emergence of the clerkship in the Supreme Court of the 
United States. While it is important to examine law clerking at this 
pre-eminent level, it can be said with some assurance that not all 
clerking is like that experienced by Supreme Court law clerks. Our 
inquiry, particularly our focus on the duties of the law clerks, must 
be broader and should include clerking as practiced at both inter­
mediate and final appellate tribunals throughout the country. Any 
description of the clerkship function limited to the personal assist­
ants of Supreme Court Justices is too narrow to suit our purposes. 
The Institute is national in scope, and the shape of law clerking may 
vary considerably as we pass from the Supreme Court to state courts 
of last resort and to state intermediate appellate tribunals. None­
theless, for purposes of historical analysis, it is easier to focus on the 
Supreme Court because of the availability of the National Archives 
and other historical sources. 15 
A. History 
A safe estimate is that almost 100 years have elapsed since law 
clerks were first employed by Supreme Court Justices. Professor 
Newland 16 and others17 attribute clerkship at this highest level of the 
13. 40 ORE. L. REV. 299 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Newland!. I have relied heavily 
upon Professor Newland's article for the historical development of the clerkship institution. 
14. See text accompanying note 5 supra. 
15. See Newland, supra note 13, at 299 n. •. 
16. See id. at 305-06. 
17. See, e.g., K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 321 (1960): 
,J. SCHMIDHAUSER THE SUPREME COURT: !Ts POLITICS, PERSONALITIES, AND PROCEDURES 119 
' 
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judiciary to Justice Horace Gray, who ascended to the bench in 
1882. Gray came to the Supreme Court from M assachusetts, where 
he served as Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court, and where 
in that capacity he began the practice of employing an honor gradu­
ate of the Harvard Law School at his own expense as "secretary." 
Thus, apparently, the clerkship owes its earliest appellation, "secre­
tary," to the terminology of Justice Gray .18 This was in 1875, and if 
these dates are correct, what has emerged as the institution of law 
clerking is almost a century old. 
The practice of hiring a young law graduate to serve as secre­
tary, of changing the clerk annually, and of making him a responsi­
ble participant in the office aspects of the judiciary was continued 
by Justice Holmes, who succeeded Gray, and by Justice Frank­
furter. Professor Llewellyn ranks it as Frankfurter's greatest contri­
bution to our law that "his vision, energy, and persuasiveness 
turned this two-judge idiosyncrasy into what shows high possibility 
of becoming a pervasive American legal institution. "19 
In the century that has passed, the law clerk has evolved in 
name as well as in substance. One might describe this evolution as 
"up from 'secretary , ' "  for the law clerk, after escaping Justice 
Gray 's initial characterization , has been relabeled periodically, 
passing from secretary to the more attractive "law clerk," "law 
assistant," "research aide," and "legal assistant. "20 Wisconsin calls 
its clerks "law examiners. "21 There is, however, occasional slippage 
on this point: consider the designation "brief reader. "22 
By statute, the term "law clerk" is a secure characterization in 
the federal courts, and it is this term that is generally utilized to 
describe the office today. Although historically the first official ref-
( 1960): S .  Wu.LISTON. LIFE AND LAW 87 (1940) [hereinafter cited as Wn.LISTONI. 
18. See Newland. supra note 13, at 301 n.5. 
19. K. LLF.WF.LLYN, supra note 17. at 321. 
20. See AMF.RICAN .JUDICATURE SOCIETY, tau· Clerks in State Appellate Courts, Rep. No. 
1'1, at .J. 8 (1968). 
21. Wis. STAT. ANN.  § 251.04(6) (1971). 
22. The quest ion just what to call the law clerk has always been troublesome. The terms 
"secretary'" and "clerk" suggest a typist or file clerk, and at one time there may have been 
g<l(>cl reason to use this designation since the tasks in the beginning were indeed on the 
secretarial side. However, as the institution matured in the tasks assigned it, the designation 
"rlerk" hecame a misnomer i�taken too literally. This would often require the young graduate 
to explain the substance of his first employment, at least to his parents, lest they think that 
the past :1 �·ears had produced a file clerk, not an attorney. As a result, we have been told 
nne state changed the designation from law clerk to "briefing attorney" to satisfy its clerks' 
request for a little more prestige . •  Johnson, What [)() /,aw Clerks Do? 22 TEXAS B.J. 229 
( l�li>!l) · A fair inference is that a similar purpose underlay the various ch�nges in terminology 
dl·srrihe<l in the text. 
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erence to the office was in terms of "stenographic clerk,"23 the 
United States Code authorizes appointment by the Justices of "law 
clerks and secretaries whose salaries shall be fixed by the Court. "2� 
Thus the dichotomy between the law side and the clerical side, even 
the term "law clerk" itself, is frozen in the pages of the Federal 
Code. Interestingly enough, in explaining just what it is that Su­
preme Court clerks do, one former clerk points out that this entry 
in the Code carries the distinction of never having been construed 
by the very judiciary the institution serves. 25 
At first blush it might appear significant to one acquainted 
with the traditions of judicial administration that the law clerk's 
genesis has been attributed to Horace Gray while he sat as Chief 
Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. The office of 
chief justice has always been considered responsible for innovations 
in the internal opera ting procedures of the court, 26 and it would 
seem natural that a chief justice should be the one responsible for 
introduction of the law clerk as an aid to the justices. Such is not 
the history of it, however, and the truth of the matter shatters the 
cynic's notion that those interested in efficient judicial administra­
tion are always incompetent as jurisprudes.27 I for one would have 
thought it highly unlikely that John Chipman Gray, Harvard's cele­
brated legal philosopher,28 would have contributed anything toward 
improving the administration, as well as the abstraction, of justice. 
But history has it that it was Gray the philosopher who passed to 
2:J. Congress first authorized clerical assistants for Supreme Court Justices in the Sun­
dry Civil Act of Aug. 4, 1886. The Act provided "for stenographic clerk for the Chief Justice 
and for each associate justice of the Supreme Court, at not exceeding one thousand six 
hundred dollars each .. . . " 24 Stat. 254 (1886). This first authorization was in response to 
Attorney General A.H. Garland's request to Congress in his Annual Report of 1885 that the 
.Justices be given clerical assistance because of the press of the Court's judicial business. See 
Newland, supra note 13, at 301. 
24. 28 U.S.C. § 675 (1970). Provision for law clerks for United States Courts of Appeals 
judges was made in 1930, 46 Stat. 774 (1930), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 712 (1970), and for 
United States District Court judges in 1936, 49 Stat. 1140, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 752 
( 1970). 
25. Johnson, supra note 22, at 229. 
26. The work of the late Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Chief Justice of the New Jersey Supreme 
Court is the paradigm. Among Vanderbilt's many writings on judicial reform see T HE CHAL­
LENGE OF LAW REFORM (1955) and MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINIS TRATION ( 1949). For 
details concerning other renowned chief judges and their work toward improving judicial 
administration see JUSTICE IN THE STATES: ADDRESSES AND PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE 
ON THF. JUDICIARY, Mar. 11-14, 1971, at x-xii, and Pringle, The Role of the State Chief Justice. 
id. at 80. See generally Burton, Judging l� Also Administration, 21 TEMP. L.Q. 77 (194i). 
27. For the origin of this word see K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE �USH 10 (1960): .. 
28. Professor Gray is best known for the first systematic exposition of legal pos1t1v1sm 
in this country. See, e.g., J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE l...Aw (1909). 
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his half brother, Chief Justice Horace, the thought of using a young 
law graduate as legal secretary. 29 
B. Etiology 
There is one tenet of judicial ad ministration that rem ains 
straight and true when measured against the growth of law clerking. 
The etiology of the clerkship-the origin of the institution in terms 
of its causes-again proves the truth of John Frank's observation in 
Marble Palace, his classic biography of the Suprem e  Court: "As the 
work load increases, the methods must be streamlined or else the 
work output will go down. "30 The clerkship represents the judiciary's 
response, initially fortuitous, to the press of the cases; it is applica­
tion of the principle of division of labor to the judicial process-an 
application from which there has been no escape, even for Justice 
Rehnquist. For better or worse, the clerkship has proved the invari a­
ble, now deliberate, response to the growth of appellate case loads 
throughout the country. 31 
Consistent with this etiological thesis, one would guess that 
around 1882, the date Justice Gray first used law clerks, the Su­
preme Court of the United States began to experience the case load 
brunt of the new industrial growth occurring toward the end of the 
nineteenth century. A second look at Marble Palace and Frank's 
data proves the guess right. When the Supreme Court first met in 
1790 there were no law clerks , nor was there any need for them. The 
first Supreme Court, Frank tells us, had nothing to do;  it adjourned. 
Near the end of the nineteenth century, however, vital changes 
occurred .  The country expanded to its present national borders and 
increased its population and commerce enormously. And the busi­
ness of the Supreme Court expanded with the growing country. The 
Court began to encounter a real demand on its time about 1850. It 
reached a point of full production and became swamped by about 
1875, when it was producing something like 200 opinions a year and 
could not keep up with the flood of new work.32 From the data it 
29. See WILLISTON, supra note 17, at 87. 
30. J. FRANK, MARBLE PALACE 113 (1958) [hereinafter cited as FRANK]. 
31. See AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, Accommodating the Workload of the United States 
Courts of Appeals: Report of Recommendations 2 (1968); AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, SoLUTio�s FOR APPELLATE CouRT CONGESTION AND DELAY, Infor. Sheet No. 24, at 7-8 (1963); Breen, Solutions for Appellate Court Congestion, 47 J. AM. Jun. Soc'y 228, 230 (1964); Lum­bar� , Current Problems of the Federal Courts of Appeals, 54 CORNELL L. REY. 29, 39 (1968) (Chief Judge Lumbard calls for more law clerks at the federal intermediate appellate level 
m response to alarming growth in the case loads). 
32. FRANK, supra note 30, at 12, 288. 
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appears the introduction of the law clerk in the early 1880's was no 
historical accident; rather the clerkship sprang up as the Court's 
own protective response to its burgeoning docket. In this regard, it 
is significant that Attorney General Garland's 1885 Report to Con­
gress contains the first official mention of clerkship assistance for 
the Supreme Court Justices, together with criticisms of the delay 
present in the transaction of the High C ourt's business and with a 
plea for remedial m easures. To quote Garland: 
I believe it would greatly facilitate the business of the Supreme Court if 
each justice was provided by law with a secretary or law clerk, to be a stenogra­
pher, to be paid an annual salary sufficient to obtain the requisite qualifica­
tions, whose duties shall be to assist in such clerical work as might be assigned 
to him.'"' 
The data of the twentieth century also suggest that an increas-
. ing case load often requires a change in the method of the Court's 
business. This time the change was one of degree, not of kind: hiring 
was doubled . Now there were two cle:r;ks, a practice inaugurated in 
1941 by Chief Justice Stone in response to further growth in the 
Court's business.:it By 1947 each.Justice was authorized to hire two 
law clerks, and again one might correctly guess there was something 
peculiar about the case load that year-it was 1947 when in forma 
pauperis petitions first began to cause serious problems of docket 
management .35 Finally, continued encroachment on the time charts 
of the Justices precipitated the most recent change in the policy of 
the Court, an allotment of three law clerks to each Supreme Court 
Justice.:i6 
Were one to broaden the inquiry to include state courts and 
there test these views about the emergence of law clerks, no signifi­
cant departure from the federal experience would appear. Recent 
figures establish that in those states where case loads are compara­
tively small, little use is made of law clerks. Wyoming, for example, 
employs none.37 There are four other states-Maine, Missouri, Ne­
braska, and Vermont-whose appellate judges until recently were 
also wholly without law clerks.38 None, however, is notorious for any 
:n 1885 Arr'v GEN. ANN. REP. 43. 
34. Newland, supra note 13, at 303. 
:l5. Id. at 304. 
:l6. See Report on the Problems of the Judiciary 2, 10-11, Address by Chief Justice 
Warren E. Burger, American Bar Association Annual Meeting, Aug. 14
.
' 1972. 
,, . :n. "At this time we have no law clerks, administrators or staff assistance. Letter from 
Chief .Justice John J. Mcintyre to Paul R. Baier, Sept. 22, 1972. 
:18. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, State Court Systems 80-83 (rev. ed. 1970) 
I hereinafter cited as COUNCILi. Justice Harry A. Spencer of the ebraska Supreme Court, 
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Lately other state courts have also increased previously mm1-
mal use of law clerks in response to swelling appellate dockets. For 
example, the seven justices of the Kansas Supreme Court have in­
creased their staff of clerks from four to nine.:rn Similarly, the num­
ber of clerks serving the Supreme Court of North D akota doubled 
in 1971.�° Finally, the need for more clerks has even touched New 
Hampshire,41 despite that State's long tradition of independence 
exemplified by John Doe, its spirited Chief Justice, who not only 
wrote for himself without the help of law clerks, but who also was 
quite ready to write for any of his colleagues willing-or impor­
tuned-to let him.42 
California, on the other hand, le ads the country in the number 
of law clerks authorized and serving that State's judiciary. Over 30 
clerks serve the California Supreme Court alone. i:i Of these, approxi-
who was at the Law Center as a member of  the Institute's faculty, told me that Nebra�ka 
now provides one law clerk for each justice, a practice inaugurated in 1972. The 7 just ice$ of 
the Supreme Court of Missouri now have one law clerk each. These clerks are employed for 
one year at a salary of $10,000. Letter from Chief Justice James A. Finch, .Jr. to Paul R. Baier. 
Sept. 26, 1972. The Maine Supreme Court recently has completed a pilot year using law 
clerks, and its chief justice hopes the state legislature will continue the practice permanently. 
Letter from Chief Justice Armand A. Dufresne, Jr. to Paul R. Baier, Sept. 25, 1972. In 
January 1972, 2 law clerks were hired for the 5 justices of the Vermont Supreme Court. 
Telephone conversation with Lawrence Turgeon, Court Administrator, Vermont Supreme 
Court, Sept. 19, 1972. 
39. The court had 4 clerks as late as 1970. See COUNCIL, supra note 38, at 80. As of Sept. 
1, 1972, Kansas had 9 law clerks, one for each of the 7 justices and 2 for court commissioners. 
The increase was necessitated by growth in the case load. Interview with Douglas Richards. 
law clerk to Justice A.S. Schroeder, Kansas Supreme Court, in Baton Rouge, Aug. 30, 1972; 
see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-3122 (1969). 
40. The Supreme Court of North Dakota employed 2 additional law clerks under the 
Emergency Employment Act of 1971. Letter from Chief Justice Alvin C. Strutz to Paul R. 
Baier, Sept. 25, 1972. 
41. In 1970, New Hampshire's 5 Supreme Court justices shared one law clerk. See 
CouNCIL, supra note 38, at 81. The court now has 5 law clerks. Letter from Justice William 
A. Grimes to Paul R. Baier, Aug. 23, 1972. 
42. See Reid, Doe Did Not Sit-The Creation of Opin ions by an Artist, 63 COLUM. L. 
REV. 59 (1963). Justice William Grimes of the New Hampshire Supreme Court, who was also 
at the Institute as a faculty member, informed me that Doe's "New Hampshire Method" was 
still alive and well in Concord: 
"What justice requires" is the test of many things in N.H. law; and if the court has 





to mathematical and mechanical minds, and to j�dges who 
want to avoid the cultivat10ns and laborious use of practical judgment on matters of fact 
hy applying a two foot rule taken from the N.H. Reports. 
Letter from Charles Doe to Frank Nesmith Parsons Oct 28 1895 q t d · 63 C L 
REV. at fi:l. 
, . ' , uo e m OLUM. . 
4;3_ See COUNCIL, supra note 38, at 80. Chief Justice Donald R. Wright currently em-
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mately half are career employees pursuing a sort of professional 
clerkship, 41 but that still leaves over two clerks for each of the seven 
justices. New York is next with sixteen clerks authorized for the 
seven judges of the Court of Appeals.45 In both of these States law­
suits are aplenty, and litigation is a way of life. Again it seems the 
more cases on the docket, the more law clerks . Pennsylvania and 
Illinois also rank high on the list, with two clerks for each supreme 
court justice. 46 
To one convinced that the clerkship's contribution is indeed an 
enhancement of the rationality of judgment, all these figures could 
easily tempt a devilish inquiry. I for one recall very few cases of 
moment fro m Kansas or from Wyoming. On the other hand, it 
might be fair to draw a favorable inference about the value of law 
clerks from the fact that all  the great cases in the books are from 
New York, or from the pen of California's Traynor-assisted by no 
lean complement of professional and perennial law clerks. I doubt 
the number of law clerks has anything at all to do with the quality 
of a court's justice. I have my suspicions, however, that it may 
affect-and for the better-the quantity,47 indeed even the quality,48 
ploys 12 clerks, 8 permanent and 4 yearly appointees. He reports that, "I need them all, and 
more!" Telephone conversation with Chief Justice Donald Wright, Oct. 5, 1972. 
44. COUNCIL, supra note 38, at 82 n.d. 
45. Id. at 81. 
46. Id. at 80, 81. 
47. The same conclusion is reached by Judge Winslow Christian in Using Prehearing 
Procedures to Increase Productivity, Panel Discussion before the Section of Judicial Adminis­
tration, Appellate Judges Conference, Proceedings of the American Bar Association 93rd 
Annual Meeting, Aug. 8, 1970, printed in 52 F.R.D. 55, 60 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Panel 
Discussion]: 
[T]he way work is organized and staffed does have a weighty impact on the volume 
of the court's product. We cannot produce the increased volume of quality work that the 
public demands until we teach ourselves, through diligent practice and bold experiment, 
new ways of organizing our work. Above all, we must learn to adopt in some cases the 
role of staff supervisor. We must learn to save the personal craftsmanship of the judges 
for special cases . 
. Judge Christian is currently on leave from the California Court of Appeal and is serving 
as Director of the newly established National Center for State Courts. See Reardon, The Ne11• 
National Center for State Courts-Progress and Prospects, 55 JUDICATURE 66 (1971). 
48. See Braden, The Value of /,aw Clerks, 24 Miss. L.J. 295 (1953) ("If a judl{e has a 
competent. law clerk to help him, his decision ought to be better than would be the case if 
the judge had to work alone."). But see Christian, supra note 47, at. 60 ("fTlhe way staff is 
u�ed, and the way cases are assigned, are probably neutral factors from the point of view of 
the (/lia!ity of the decisional process."). . 
A former Solicitor General of the United St.ates, Erwin Griswold, has added his own 
speculation about the effect of law clerks on the length and quality of Supreme Court opin· 
ions. Arcording t.o Griswold, the law clerks may now in fact perform some of the work 
t raclit ionally performed by appellate counsel, with the result that more time is spent in post· 
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of that same court's judgments. Perhaps those jurisdictions with 
more law clerks also have better appellate opinions.49 Surely the 
question is worthy of research, albeit the task would require its 
master to devise some measure of the quality of a ppellate court 
judgments. Until then we are remitted to our own speculations 
about these matters; any definitive resolution must await a later 
date. 
C. The Nascent Institution 
A final aspect of the history of the law clerkship remains for 
consideration. It brings us back to the present, to this very confer­
ence, for in a significant way the Institute contains its own fair 
measure of history. Your participation here manifests a new plateau 
in the evolution of the law clerk as participant in today's judicial 
process. 
There has been much use of the word institution to describe the 
current status of the law clerks . Much of the writing about them 
reflects this usage. Even my title proffers what follows as: "Profile 
of an Institution." Yet until this conference an important indicium 
of the clerk's institutional maturity was missing. T his Law Clerk 
Institute fills the gap. Let me elaborate . 
A sociologist would tell us one measures the maturity of an 
institution by the social distance that separates its human partici­
pants from the functions they serve, the roles they play in society. 
Only humorously, says Webster, is an individual considered an in­
stitution.50 Literally, and from the Latin, an institution is something 
that has set in, a practice that is a persistent element of the life of 
an organized social group. Take the judiciary for example. It is easy 
for one unsteeped in the law to think of a judge or court anony-
argument research and discussion. Does this, he asks, in tum "[lead] to longer opinions 
because of th� �kill and zeal with which points are raised-and perhaps even [lead] to more 
d1ssentmg opm1ons and concurring opinions?" Griswold, Appellate Advocacy, 26 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 342, 354 ( 19 71 ). 
49. "If th� appellate judge is at all pressed for time, the presence of a competent clerk 
may spell the difference between sloppy and workmanlike opinions." Braden supra note 48 at 296. ' ' 
Professor Carrington ha.s made the point, however, that there is a danger in going over­board here. It would ?e possible to equip a single judge with a very large staff so that he could then manage the entITe appellate business of the federal courts. And it is likely that such an opera.tion ':"ould produce �.
ery craftsm�nl.ike decisions. But at what cost? Professor Carrington descnhes 1t as a loss of the humanistic emphasis on the 1·nd' 'd ) ' I · th · d' · l ,, . 1v1 ua s ro e m e JU 1cia process .
. 
Carrington, The Dangers of Judicial D elegation: Concluding Remark.� Panel Dis-cuss1011, m 52 F.R.D. 76, 78. ' 
.')O. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1288 (2d ed. 1936). 
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mously. Yet to our legal minds the expression "judge" conj ures up 
Lord Mansfield, Holmes, or Cardozo-maybe even Musmanno. To 
a sociologist these are all personalities. The man is not the office. 
And, as it matures, it is the office that comes to have identifiable 
characteristics a l l  its own. Such a step occurred in the evolution of 
the judge as an institution when the early Italian cities first chose 
their adjudicators from the outside, from other cities, in order to 
secure the objective impartiality of a stranger. 51 Similarly, an insti­
tution's growth can also be measured by its trappings, by all the 
froufrou that surrounds it and interposes the necessary distance 
between social performance and personality. Recall that John Frank 
titled his institutiona l  study of the Supreme Court not by reference 
to any of its personalities, but to its marble.52 
To continue for the moment with the judge, this country's first 
se minar for appellate judges was conducted at New York Univer­
sity's School of Law in the summer of 1956.53 Again, this is all 
froufrou, although as its Director, Professor Robert Leflar, pointed 
out, "[ijt was a working seminar. "54 Yet for our purposes the idea 
of a seminar for j udges is significant because it reflects the institu­
tion of judge, qua judge-apart from the man that is. The goal was 
better performance of the judicial function, not the improvement of 
personality. 55 
So it is with the Law Clerk Institute, an event Louisiana State 
University hopes to continue in the tradition of the Appellate 
Judges S eminar. With it-and to complete the history-the clerk­
ship as an institution has come of age. 
Ill. SELECTION, TENURE, AND SALARY 
A. Selection 
It used to be the tradition, at least for the Supreme Court of 
the United States, that law school professors would recommend to 
Justices who were personal friends the young men chosen as clerks.56 
51. G. SIMMEL, THE SocJOLOGY OF GEORG S1MMEL 404 (K. Wolff transl. 1950). 
52. In MARBLE PALACE Frank also makes explicit this social dichotomy between the man 
and his office: "[A]ny good Justice maintains not merely an individual but also an institu-
tional sense." FRANK, supra note 30, at 260; see id. at 143. . . 
fi:l. See generally Leflar, The Appellate Judges Seminar at New York Unwers1.ty, 9 J. 
LF:GAL Eo. 359 (1956). 
54. Id. 
fifi. SeP Leflar, Continuing Education for Appellate Judges, 15 BUFFALO L. REV. 370 
19()!')). 
56. Ser WILLISTON, supra note 17, at 87; Dorsen, Law Clerks in Appellate Courts in the 
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Often, as in the case of Harvard's Williston, these professors had 
themselves served this same Justice at one time as law clerk. Willis­
ton clerked for Horace Gray, who initiated the clerkship practice in 
the Supreme Court.57 Holmes, succeeding Gray, continued to accept 
the recommendations of John Chipman Gray, Horace's half brother 
and professor . Later Holmes used Frankfurter to appoint his 
clerks. 58 One of Professor Frankfurter's selections was Barton Leach, 
who served Justice Holmes in 1925. Like Williston before him, secre­
tary Leach was later to become a law professor, and, happily as it 
turned out, Leach proved one of Harvard's finest wits, in both senses 
of the word. To him we owe one of the better published reminis­
cences about law clerking.59 
There were other, less savory means of selection, however. On 
occasion a Justice hired his own son, or the son of a fellow Justice. 
The first Harlan, for instance, chose his son John Maynard Harlan, 
father of the second Justice Harlan, as law clerk.60 However, from 
what I know of Harlan opinions, both those of the first and of the 
second-they are always quite good-all this only proves the wis­
dom of Machiavelli's advice to the Prince about hiring good secre­
taries: "The first impression that one gets of a ruler and of his brains 
is from seeing the men that he has about him ."61 
Ordinarily the selection criteria for the position require the pro­
spective clerk to have graduated at or near the top of his law school 
class, and because of the nature of the tasks to be performed, there 
has emerged a preference for graduates with law review experience 
or some comparable research and writing while in law school . 62 
Sometimes the idiosyncrasies of a particular judge i mpose addi­
tional requirements. Professor Newland's article reports that Jus­
tice McReynolds, for instance, was plagued with troubles in locating 
and retaining his clerks because he made it a requirement of the 
office that his secretaries remain single and that they refrain from 
using tobacco while on the job .63 Other judges are not such marti­
nets. Justice Black preferred clerks who could play a good game of 
l !nited 8tatr"'· 26 MODERN L. REV. 265, 266 ( 1963); Hills, A Law Clerk at the Supreme Court 
of the I !11it1•d States, 33 Los ANGELES B. BULL. 333 n.4 (1958) . 
'17. Sr•r• W11.1.1STON . supra note 17, at 87. 
'1H. Sci• Newland, supra note 13, at 306. 
'1!l. l '.ea('h, lfrcol/1•cti11ns rif a Holmes Secretary, 1941 HARV. L. SCHOOL BULL. 12 .  60. .'i1·1· Newland, supra note 13,  at  306. 
6 1 .  N . . MAClllAVF.l.1.1, THE PRINCE 1 14 ( Mentor ed. Ricci transl. 1952). 
6'J. " ... - • 1•r• , .OlfNCll., supra note 38. at 82-8:l nn.c,k,w, ai. 
6:1. :-.lr•wlnn<l, supra note 1:1. at :l06-07. 
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tennis , married or not . 'il Nevertheless, no j udge, I am sure, would 
approve the nasty habit of working with one's shoes off, even with 
feet tucked carefully beneath a desk crowded with the reports. I was 
once called to task for that. Somehow I just think better with my 
shoes off. I quickly changed my ways though, after Chief Judge 
Lesinski rem inded me in no laconic fashion of the adage that it is 
important that j ustice appear to be done. This almost tempted an­
other of those c urious inquiries, but the Chief Judge quickly added 
that it was his court . That was enough for me although later re­
search proved that Justice, at least all the statuary I observed, 
stands barefoot as well as blindfolded. 65 
Further personal preference may confine a judge in his selection 
to one law school or to a particular geographical area. Justices Gray, 
Holmes, and Brandeis relied exclusively on Harvard for their clerks . 
In the main so did Frankfurter after ascending the bench. Similarly, 
other law schools have had the good fortune of having "their Jus­
tice" on the Supreme Court. Each year Chief Justice Taft took his 
clerks from Yale at the recommendation of its then Dean Charles 
E. Clark. Michigan was the favorite of Justice Murphy; Minnesota 
was the source of Justice Butler's clerks. Justice Vinson favored 
Northwestern, and Justice Minton relied on Indiana. Often these 
favorites with the Justices were the schools they themselves had 
attended.6n 
Appointment on the basis of the judge 's geographical back­
ground is also commonplace . At the Supreme Court Justice Douglas 
has favored appointees from the West Coast, Justice Black more 
often than not selected southerners as his clerks, and Justice Whit­
taker selected his clerks from the Midwest.67 
At the state level there is, as one would expect, a tendency for 
the judges to select their clerks from local law schools. A prominent 
local school often finds appellate judges of the home state particu­
larly willing to hire its top graduates, although not required to do 
so. In Michigan the situation is probably typical.  During the year 
64. See FRANK, supra note 30, at 1 16. 
6fi. I have hanging in my office a photograph of the facade of the Unit�d States Supreme 
Court. that. depicts Themis herself sitting atop a large marble column ad1acent .to t he steps 
of the Court .  This photo clearly shows a rather large naked toe and bare foot JUt.lm.
g out f rom 
under her gown. Yet she is not even studying the reports. For those wh� would insist on a 
more formal citation Themis's foot is similarly displayed au nature/ in COMPILATION OF 
WORKS OF ART AND O;HER OBJECTS IN THE UNITED STATES CAPITOL 289 (U.S.  Gov. Print ·  Office 
1 !>6!i ) .  
66. See Newland, supra note 13, at 308. 
67. S<'e id. at 309. 
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just ended, of that State's twenty law clerks for both its Supreme 
Court and its Court of Appeals, eighteen were from Michigan law 
schools, including the Universities of Michigan and Detroit, Wayne 
State, and the Detroit College of Law. Sometimes a j udge will buck 
the local schools and opt for a graduate of a national law school. The 
two remaining clerks in Michigan last year were from Yale and 
Northwestern. 68 Where the judge is fortunate enough to have two 
clerks, he will often split the difference. 
Little is known about the mechanics of selection in the state 
courts, although the latest national survey of state court systems 
provides some general information. In most states law clerks are 
selected by individual judges, but the specific criteria and require­
ments are unknown . In my own case I just happened across a letter 
soliciting a clerk posted on a special bulletin board at the law school . 
Most law school placement offices maintain a file of clerkship solici­
tations. 
In some states the court as a whole selects the clerks through a 
special procedure or agency. In Maryland, for instance, the court's 
administrative office first interviews prospective clerks . In Massa­
chusetts a single justice screens all the clerkship candidates .  An­
other jurisdiction, after group selection for the court as a whole, 
follows the practice of assigning the clerks to individual judges by 
lot. Some j urisdictions use a committee of judges appointed by the 
chief judge to interview prospective clerks and to m ake recommen­
dations to the entire court .69 Judge Lesinski's court in Michigan has 
an extensive recruitment program designed to solicit clerks from 
across the nation. Each year a committee of the judges personally 
interviews candidates throughout M ichigan, and a special trip is 
68. Letter from Robert Avery, Research Attorney, Pre-Hearing Division, Michigan. 
Court of Appeals, to Paul R. Baier, Aug. 28, 1972. 
The situation in Michigan, however, might be regarded as exceptional by some, espe­
cially University of Michigan law alumni. No denigration is intended since I put Michigan 
in the "national" category-whatever that is. No doubt Michigan alumni would prefer that 
Ohio be taken as illustrative. Accordingly, in Ohio last year the 8th District Court of Appeals 
judges selected their clerks from Case-Western, Cleveland State, Ohio State, Cornell, and 
Wisconsin. Letter from Judge Jack G. Day to Paul R. Baier, Aug. 25, 1972. Judge Day 
informed me at the Institute that the absence of Michigan clerks was fortuitous, since each 
year his court tries to recruit Michigan graduates as clerks. His own interest in good judging, 
I was t old, "rises above all that nonsense alumni rivalry." And, I would add, Judge Day's 
present ation at the conference proved him hardly a man interested exclusively in football . 
. Judge Day was the Institute's resident jurisprude, tendering to the clerks his thoughts on 
" L ogic and .Judicial Reasoning." Very heavy stuff indeed. 
69. -"<'<' Co11NCIL, supra note 38, Table XIV, at 83 nn.j,l,n,p. 
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made to the East Coast as well .  711 Finally, one jurisdiction selects its 
clerks on the reco m m endations of a law school placement board.11  
B. Tenure 
The brevity of the clerkship is one of its institutional character­
istics. n The tradition is for a short term, usually one year. And there 
is the view that this period is purposefully short, allowing fresh 
blood to circulate anew each year in the judiciary. The idea is that 
with the rapid turnover the judges are kept in touch with what is 
happening at the law schools-doctrinally, that is.73 Equally impor­
tant,  with each new cub of independent spirit the judge obtains all 
the enthusiasm and zeal the young graduate brings to his first job.  
Karl Llewellyn puts it  this way : 
[T]he recurring and unceasing impact of a young junior in the task is the best 
medicine yet discovered by man against the hardening of a senior's mind and 
imagination . . . .  "A new model every year" may have little to commend it 
in the matter of appliances or motorcars or appellate judges, but it has a great 
deal to offer in the matter of appellate judges' clerks; there then arrives yearly 
in the judge's chambers a reasonable sampling of information and opinion 
derived from the labors, over the three past years, of an intelligent group of 
men specializing i n  the current growth and problems of our law: the faculty 
which has reared the new apprentice. This is a time-cheap road to stimulus 
and to useful leads.  ;J 
70. Interview with N. Otto Stockmeyer, Director of the Michigan Pre-Hearing Division, 
in Baton Rouge, Aug. 29, 1972. Mr. Stockmeyer was also on the faculty of the Institute. 
7 1 .  See COUNCIL, supra note 38, Table XIV, at 83 n.s. Another member of the faculty, 
Judge Robert T. Mann of the Florida Court of Appeal, 2d District, informed me that it was 
his practice to hire clerks on the recommendation of University of Florida Law School profes­
sors. 
72. "The law clerks are the only employees of the Supreme Court for whom a tradition 
of short-term employment has developed. The one-year terms common for clerks today are 
in contrast to the distinguishing concept of continuity that attaches to everything else about 
the court ."  Newland, supra note 13, at 305. See also id. at 316. 
73. "A recent graduate from law school is, to be sure, innocent in the practical way of 
the law, but he is also likely to be learned in what may be called the frontiers of the law, the 
new ideas being evolved in the halls of the scholars of the law. The law develops, as it must 
if it is to meet the needs of a changing society, and the judges who pronounce the law need 
all the help that they can get in keeping the law abreast of the times." Braden, supra note 
48, at 297; see text accompanying note 4 supra. 
I wonder whether there is not room for the law clerk to keep his judge in touch with what 
is happening literally too. See People v. Lorentzen, 387 Mich. 167, 194 N.W.2d 827 ( 1 972); 
People v. Sinclair, 387 Mich. 9 1 ,  194 N.W.2d 878 ( 1972) ; FRANK, supra note 30, at 149-50: 
"How t.o keep Justices appointed for life themselves in tune with the throbbing life of the 
American people and to prevent their becoming remote high priests of a mysterious ritual 
has concerned some of the best minds in the country since 1790." Frank mentions the aban­
doned practice of circuit riding for the Justices and also social gatherings. ld. at !iiO, l li2. 
But the law clerk is not mentioned as a possible conduit of the Zeitgeist. 
74. K.  LLEWELLYN, supra note 17, at 322. 
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While the tradition of yearly appointment promotes the infu­
sion of new ideas and vigor into the judicial process, the time -drain 
of breaking in a n ew clerk each year must be reckoned with. One 
way is the practice of having the retiring clerk inform his successor 
of the ways of the office. This Institute represents a second,  more 
concerted effort in the same direction. There is nothing quite like 
actually doing the job, however, and thus a natural tension exists 
between the ideal of a short term and an interest in retaining the 
experienced clerk. It seems a particularly wasteful scheme to em­
ploy a clerk for only one year, for at the very moment he steps down 
he has his best feel for the art . It would appear more efficient to 
continue the clerk for another year,75 and another-perhaps even 
permanently. 
Some clerks remain on for quite some time.  Justice McKenna's 
first clerk was with him for twelve years, until the clerk's death. 
There are also cases in which an enduring tenure is finally ended 
by the death of the judge , rather than the clerk. One of Butler's 
clerks worked for sixteen years until the Justice's death in 1939. 7r. 
Clearly some tradeoff is necessary between efficiency and the 
advantages of yearly rehire. It was Chief Justice Stone who inaugu­
rated the practice of overlapping terms for his two clerks , making 
one the "senior," the other the "junior" law clerk . The senior was 
always a carryover junior, who was then allowed to test his experi­
ence against a second year, serving at the same time as mentor for 
his junior.77 In the state courts the line is usually drawn at the end 
of the first year, and in most jurisdictions today the law clerk serves 
for one year.7R 
A further tradition is that the clerk's tenure runs with the 
judge, not with the office. Justice Holmes once referred to this in a 
letter confirming the appointment of one of his clerks. S aving the 
Governm ent harmless from suit, Holmes quipped at the end ,  "I 
assume you realize that I reserve the right to die or resign . "79 
C. Salary 
What about salary? How much is the other fellow making? This 
7'1. However, "lwl hat the judge gains in ease of administration h e  loses in quality of 
service." Rraden, supra note 48, at 298. 
7o. S<'e Newland, supra note 13, at 307. 
77. S1•e id. at :!04. 
78. CouNr.11.. wpra note 38, Table XIV, at 80-82. 
79. Leach, supra note 59, at 13. 
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is another of t h ose topics somehow inherently capable of rousing 
interest . In California  in 1 972 some of the other fellows were drawing 
30, 564 dol lars a year . so Surely this is the type of pronouncement that 
pushes you off your seat as well as toward the edge. But these are 
the career clerks , the permanent " Principal Attorneys" who work in 
the Ca l iforn ia system . s t  A safe guess for law clerks in the traditional 
sense is that t hey earn between 10,000 and 15,000 dollars for their 
year with the court . Anything more specific I would leave to other 
authors, for the rewards I am interested in detailing have nothing 
to do wit h  money . 
IV. D UTIES82 
We reach that favorite question of these surveys : What do law 
clerks do?s:i Undoubtedly the question will be put to you at least 
once during your clerkship by some curious interlocutor. Perhaps by 
80. Letter from Ralph N. Kleps, Court Administrator, California Supreme Court, to 
Paul R. Baier, Oct. 1 9 ,  1 97 2 .  This represents an increase of $4,416 since 1970. See CouNCIL, 
supra note :38, Table XIV, at 80. 
8 1 .  See CouNctL, supra note 38, Table XIV, at 82 n .d .  
82. Those who have written on the clerkship often point out that because of  the  confi­
dential nature of the job it is difficult accurately to discuss the scope of the duties of the clerk. 
Professor \:ewland notes: "Because of the confidential nature of the court's inner operations, 
it is impossible to describe the duties of the clerks in exacting detail . "  Newland, supra note 
1:3, at :ll t n .36. Newland attributes the lack of information to the confidentiality of the 
position, quoting .Justice Brandeis's instructions to his clerk Louis Jaffe: "He once told me 
that I was never to let anyone know what we were working on,  not even the secretaries of the 
other .Just ices . "  Id. But it m ight be asked whether a distinction can be drawn between the 
tasks of clerking and the q u estions under j udicial consideration-something like the 
procedure-substance dichotomy. That is to say, why should confidentiality of things sub 
judice close the mouths of the clerks as to the nature of their job? Judge Medina of the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals has asked the same question: "Why is this? Are we all living in a 
world of sham 'I Is there some point in pretense or i l lusion, all in the cause of the dignity of 
the courts9 . . And so I ask the question: thus working together is it possible that my law 
clerk has no influence on my views of the law? I think it is not possible; of course he has some 
influence on the decisional process in which I participate; and that is the very reason I have 
him as my law clerk. Why deny it?" Medina, Some Refiections on the Judicial Function at 
/hf! Appellate Level, 1961 WASH. U.L.Q. 148, 154, 155. 
I suspect the low visibil ity of the clerk's duties in the literature is not a product of the 
conlidentiality of the case load itself. Rather, an interest in preserving the symbolism of the 
judicial office is at work here. The traditional image is one of the judge working alone without 
the aid of any staff, and probably those faithful to the judicial process share the view th_
at 
this image should be m a intained in the public's eye.  See Carrington, The Danl{ers of Judll'lal 
/Je/<'gation: Concluding Remarks, Panel Discussion, Am. Bar Ass'n Annual Meeting, Aug. 8, 
H J70, !i2 F' .R .D.  76, 78. As a consequence, confidentiality of the case load engulfs t he p:ocess 
of decision-making as well, including the role of the law clerks, in order to mamtam t he 
appearance of "individualized justice." 
8:3. See. e.g. , Johnson, What DO Law Clerks Do ? ,  22 TEXAS B.J. 229 ( ! 9!i9l . 
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then you will have accumulated enough of your own personal experi­
ence to provide an answer;  maybe you will even decide to record a 
formal response in the local bar j ournal . I would encourage the 
practice. There is too little hard data about this distinctly American 
institution,8� and much of what we do know about performance of 
the clerkship function comes from the personal reminiscences of 
former clerks. At least take the time toward the end of your clerk­
ship to return the Institute's questionnaire about the matter. We 
intend to improve the Institute's program in the future and, hope­
fully, to extrapolate some consensus from your responses about the 
most efficient way a judge can use his clerk. 
But to return to our interlocutor, the short answer is that given 
by one former clerk: You provide a second pair of hands and legs 
for your j udge.85 There are reports to retrieve and lots of bags to tote. 
Further, I would add that you also tender a second mind, although 
there is some controversy about this .86 You should find the next year 
filled with much collaborative thinking between you and your j udge. 
Law clerking, at least law clerking at its best, requires much conver­
sation and hard thinking between judge and clerk. 87 I recall such a 
84 . In England there are no law clerks. There is a very good reason, however, since "law 
clerks" in the American tradition would have nothing to do in England. Typically, English 
appeals are submitted without briefs and most judgments are rendered extemporaneously 
from the bench immediately after oral argument. Thus there would be no research or writing 
for the clerk to do. There are, however, a group of barristers who perform some of the fun ct.ions 
accomplished by American law clerks. These are the law reporters, who are responsible for 
checking the citations and improving the language in any opinions that are published in the 
Law Reports. See D .  KARLEN, APPELLATE CouRTs IN THE UNI TED STATES AND ENG LAND 145 
( 1963 ) .  
8 5 .  FRANK, supra note 30, at 116. 
86. One former clerk notes that it may very well be a pervasive view among the Bar 
that 2 heads are better than one except when one of the heads is fresh out of law school. 
Illustrative of such a view is the following, quoted in Braden, supra note 4 7, at 295: "Of 
course, it  may be that we are getting to the point where we have to have a certain number of 
law clerks, but I think most counsel feel that they would like to argue before the judge who 
is hearing the case, and not have it decided by some young fellow out of law school, any more 
than we can help." Similarly, Justice Tom Clark has remarked: "[D)uring my 10 years on 
the Court I have been asked by prominent lawyers, who should know better, to please speak 
to my law clerks about their petitions." Clark, Internal Operation of the United States 
Supreme Court, 43 J. AM. Jun. Soc'v 45, 48 ( 1959) .  
87. "Discussion of  a case serves to clarify a man's thoughts, and a clerk can be of  great 
value to a judge by asking pointed questions, posing alternatives, and generally acting as a 
devil's advocate. The net result of this sort of collaboration may be that the law as handed 
down differs in some respect from what would be the case were there no clerk with whom to 
discuss the case. But this is no reason to oppose clerks, for the law as handed down may differ if a judge engages in a greater or lesser amount of research . . . .  " Braden supra note 48 at 
29G. ' ' 
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moment, during a long drive back to Detroit from Grand Rapids, 
M ichigan,  where my judge had just heard a week of oral argument. 
I proved a poor chau ffeur. We were in the quick, the left lane of the 
Interstate ; somehow my efforts at verbal collaboration got the best 
of me . Although he willingly encouraged an exchange of views on 
other occasions, Judge Gillis finally interrupted me this time and 
asked whether it  was possible for me to drive faster than 40 miles 
per hour. Not only do I think better with my shoes off, but it seems 
I tend to do a b etter job with my foot off the gas pedal as well .  
You should also find this thinking between judge and clerk 
somehow follows you home from the office and envelops an evening. 
A good judge uses his clerk as sounding board to test the roots of 
judgment. In turn, sometimes a clerk will discuss the matter with 
another clerk, or on return home from the office he will use his wife 
as his own Confidential to test his latest efforts.88 All of this is meant 
in the end to assure that the judge's yea or nay is cast as close to 
the mark as possible . 
A .  Reminiscences 
I have mentioned that one obtains a fairly decent picture of the 
duties of a law clerk from the personal reflections of former clerks. 
I should like to add my own account in a moment, together with 
some commentary about the influence of a court's operating proce­
dure on the shape of a clerk's duties . What you will do next year 
Perhaps the best description in the literature of the ideal relationship between judge and 
clerk is that of Professor Philip Kurland, who served Judge Jerome N. Frank :  "With Frank 
there was never a question of your working for him ; you always worked with him. There was 
a job to be done which needed the best efforts of both and, so far as he was concerned, your 
contrihution was as essential as his." Kurland, Jerome N. Frank: Some Reflections and 
Recollections of a Law Clerk, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 661 ,  662-63 (1957). 
88. I owe the allusion to Professor Benjamin Kaplan. See Kaplan, An A m erican Lawyer 
in the Queen 's Courts: Impressions of English Civil Procedure, 69 M1cH. L. REV. 82 1 ,  846 
( 1 97 1 ) .  
I owe some substantive criticism to Mary Lou Crowley, law clerk to Judge Frank Del 
Vecchio, New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division. She put the question to me whether 
it was appropriate for a clerk to discuss his work with his fellows, or even his wife, in light of 
t he confidential nature of the job. I had to confess that perhaps my remarks were too loose; 
and, indeed, later research disclosed that some judges explicitly instruct their clerks not to  
discuss their work with anyone, including their wives. See note 82 supra. In  turn, I put  t he 
quest ion to ,Justice Albert Tate of the Louisiana Supreme Court, who spoke on t he et hies of 
t he clerksh ip at the Institute. Justice Tate was of the view that so long as the confident ia l  
nat ure of t.he discussion i s  understood b y  both parties, there i s  nothing wrong with a n  ex­
('hange of ideas between clerks about cases currently pending before the court , or with nn 
after-office dialogue between husband and wife, often unavoidable anyway. Telephone con-
versa tion with .Justice Albert Tate, Sept. 22, 1972. 
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depends to some extent on where you are going and how your court 
conducts its judicial business. First, however, it is expedient and 
instructive to quote from some of these recorded reflections. 
Samuel Williston described his work for Justice Gray in his 
autobiography Life and Law as follows : 
. . .  My task was to aid Judge Gray in his preparation of cases to be voted 
on at the consultation on the ensuing Saturday, and in  his writing of the 
opinions that were assigned to him. 
. . . When he returned from court each day he would hand me the records 
and briefs of any cases in which the arguments had been completed, and would 
tell me to look over these "novelettes," as he called the m ,  and see what I 
thought of them .  This I would do, often being compelled to work in the evening 
in order to be prepared to make my reports. When I made them, the Judge 
would question me to bring out the essential points, and I rarely learned what 
he thought of a case until I had been thoroughly cross-exam i ned.  I would also 
frequently be asked to write an opinion on the cases that had been assigned 
to the Judge . I do not wish, however, to give the impression that my work 
served for more than a stimulus for the j udge's own mind. He was a careful 
man and examined cases for himself, and wrote his own opinions ; my work 
served only as a suggestion. 
It was my duty also to read over the opinions prepared by the other 
justices which were passed around in proof to all members of the Court for 
criticism before they were ultimately delivered. Courtesy to brother justices 
sometimes prevented Judge Gray from making all the criticisms that seemed 
to me appropriate, coming, as I had, fresh from law school theorizing.'" 
In Marble Palace John Frank wrote about his w ork for Justice 
Black: 
The tasks of the clerks are also very much the product of the whims of 
their Justices. In general, it is the job of the clerk to be eyes and legs for his 
judge, finding and bringing in useful materials. This can involve an immense 
amount of work, depending upon how curious the Justice is. It is a legend that 
Justice Brandeis once asked a clerk to look at every page of every volume of 
the United States Reports looking for a particular point. The clerks may also 
have semi-social duties, like those who visited with Holmes or took walks with 
Stone or played tennis with Black, or superintended the circulation of the 
guests at the Brandeis Sunday teas. All of this is in the spirit uf an amiable 
relationship between a wise, elderly man and a young cub at the bar.  
In respect to the more serious business of the Court, som e  of the Justices 
use their clerks to summarize the petitions for certiorari, or the applications 
to be heard. Other Justices prefer to do this themselves . 
. The. 
function of the clerks ,in relation to the writing of the opinions also 
vanes widely. In the early 1940 s, at least, Justice Black wrote the first draft 
of all his opinions, except that toward the end of the year he would let the 
youngster try his hand at one first draft of something extremely unimportant. 
In my own case, the day of glory came when I did the first draft of a lone dissent 
on � minor point of statutory construction, which the Justice then revised and 
w�1ch no.o�e has .ever noticed since. Sometimes a Justice writes the first draft of one opinion while the clerk writes the first draft of another, and the opinions 
8�J. W11.1.1STON, supra note 17, at 91-92. 
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are. t h en excha�1ged a.nd the clerk writes a second draft of his Justice's opinion 
while the .Justice writes a second draft of the clerk's. Sometimes c lerks are 
al lowed to do the bulk of the serious writing for the Justice. 
The extent to which ,Justices use clerks as ghosts is largely unknown 
because of the t radit ional secrecy that surrounds each office. It is known that 
.Justice Douglas gives his clerks next to nothing to do in this area, preferring 
to keep more of t he office work in his own hands than does any other Justice. 
On the other hand, there were rumors that the excellent Clerks of Justice 
M u rphy did more of the office writing than was commonly thought proper; 
there is no corroboration of this, however, and the style of many Murphy 
opinions shows a consistency over the years indicating that they came from 
only one hand.  The most notorious rumors concern Chief Justice Vinson, who 
is said to have done all his "writing" with his hands in his pockets, outlining 
to his clerks generally what he wanted, and then criticizing this bit or that in 
a clerk's draft and making suggestions for revision.90 
Another of Justice Black's law clerks, now Professor Daniel 
Meador of the University of Virginia, adds the following: 
As in the other Justices' offices, the clerks get the weekly distribution of cer­
tiorari petitions. The task is to prepare a short memorandum on each. Year­
round these come on an average of twenty to thirty a week. Besides the "cert 
memos , "  t h e  major work is in the preparation of opinions. Here the clerk's role 
is t hat of a com b in ation research assistant, critic, sounding board, and ten­
derer of suggestions-occasionally a point of substance but more often matters 
of punctuation, p hraseology or organization. 
When "the Judge," as his clerk's [sic] call him, is assigned a case for an 
opinion he dives into reading the record and all  briefs. He absolutely masters 
the facts a n d  the arguments . Then he moves into the relevant l itera­
ture-cases, statutes, treatises, and law reviews. The clerks often read along 
with him or dig out additional material and feed it to him. The issues will be 
discussed intermittently. After a while Black will feel that he is ready to do a 
first draft of the opinion ,  assuming he has not changed his mind and decided 
to vote the other way, and this occasionally happens. The draft is then turned 
over to the c lerks, and, with all  the confidence of youth, they work it over . . . .  
Often revisions result;  sometimes a clerk can get a word or comma accepted, 
but the substance and a decision are never anything but Black's alone. " '  
Finally, Norman Dorsen, who clerked for Justice Harlan, com­
pletes our depiction of the duties generally performed by clerks at 
the S uprem e  Court: 
Some law clerks also prepare memoranda summarising [sic] the contend­
ing arguments in cases about to be heard by the court; these are known infor­
mally as " bench m emos" because the justices use them in preparation for oral 
argument. Such m emoranda outline the precedents and possible lines of ap­
proach to the case and often suggest questions for counsel. The clerks may a lso 
provide help on written opinions, such as research on legal points not covered 
or covered inadequately in the briefs of counsel ." 
90.  FRANK, supra note :lO, at 1 1 6- 18 .  , . , c- ci , , •. , 
!J I .  Meador, Jus tice H!ack and His [,all '  ( /erhs, l !i  AI.A. L .  Rn . " ' ·  .d.f>O I I . lb_ � ·  
H:!. Dorsen, supra note !i6, a t  268. Professor Dorsen also d!'rkPd f or  . Judg<•
 ( a l \'l•rl 
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A look at the federal courts of appeals discloses no great dispar­
i ty in the principal work of the clerk-"reading, research, first 
drafts, revisions, footnote supplementation, proofreading, and the 
c hecking of galley proof incident to any publishing operation . "!J:i In 
his survey Dorsen reports that a frequent practice in the federal 
c ircuits is for each judge, after oral argument but before a formal 
vote is taken, to circulate a memorandum among his brothers ex­
pressing h is views, and that law clerks may assist in preparation of 
these memoranda .94 
Passing to state appellate courts , the literature of recollection 
is  rather threadbare. There is one good piece, however, written by 
two former clerks of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. From their de­
scription I would guess the duties of Wisconsin's "law examiners" 
are typical of those performed by clerks in other j urisdictions : 
[T]he primary duty of each clerk is to prepare a legal memorandum on 
each of the cases assigned to his justice. The cases are assigned by the chief 
justice from the monthly docket, which consists of a maximum of 28 cases. 
These assignments usually are made in the last week of the preceding month,  
when the briefs have been filed. 
The memos consist of a summary of the facts, an enumeration of the 
issues, and a discussion analyzing the facts and law on each issue. They m ay 
be relatively short or quite lengthy, depending upon the complexity of the case, 
and are concluded by the clerk's recommendation . During the course of memo 
preparation the clerk may discuss the cases with his justice, but his concl u­
sions and recommendation are usually independent. His justice, of course, 
may not agree with the conclusions reached. · 
During the preparation of his memos each clerk must carefully check the 
validity of the authorities cited by each side, and then Shepardize the relevant 
cases. Too often incorrect authorities are cited in briefs . . . .  
The clerks are usually expected to read through parts of the record and 
check it against the statement of facts and appendices in the briefs . . . .  
In analyzing the legal arguments in the preparation of a memo, some 
independent research is usually required, even when the briefs are well pre­
pared. In some cases the parties do not discuss, or adequately discuss a crucial 
issue or issues .  Then, under the Court's supervision, the clerk must d
'
ig  out the 
law and attempt to consider the possible contentions on each side as to its 
application."'' 
Ma �ru<ler of the First Circuit before serving Justice Harlan. It has become somewhat preva· 
lf:'n t today t hat Supreme Court clerks work a year at the intermediate appellate level before 
serving t heir .Justices. 
9:1. .Johns<m, 8Upra note 22, at 261 .  
94. Dorsen,  ·'upra note 56, at 268; see Lumbard, Current Problems of the Federal Courts 
"f App1•als. !i4 CoRNF.LL L. REv. 29, 39-40 ( 1968) .  Justice John Francis of the New Jersey 
Su pn•mc Court has also described his use of clerks incident to post-argument procedures. See 
Franr is. P"st-1\rt;w1u•11/ l'rocedurrs, Panel Discussion, in Am. Bar Ass'n Annual Meeting 
A11g 8. 1 910.  !i:Z F . R. D .  70, 7 1 . 
' 
!l:i .  Ragat z & Shea. Supn•me Court Law Clerks, 35 Wis. B. BULL. 33, 33-34 (Aug. 1962 ) .  
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Certainly it a ppears from these recollections that any consensus 
of the duties of the l aw clerk would include the task of preparing 
memoranda on cases about to be heard, or on those that have been 
heard, in the appel late forum .  These reports serve to apprise the 
judges of the nature of the appeal and the issu.es presented, and in 
those jurisdictions where the reports are prepared prior to oral argu­
ment, they contri bute to a more effective discussion between the 
court and counsel at the hearing in the case .96 
B. The Baggage Tasks 
It is also clear that any profile of the law clerk's duties would 
include those tasks that, although clearly a part of the job, somehow 
are not felt befitting the young law graduate, who arrives at the 
court with J . D .  in hand only to find some menial task waiting in the 
wings . Take barbering for instance-an example drawn from the 
historical accounts. Our predecessor in title was the messenger, the 
fellow hired by the judge because literally there were messages to 
deliver and bags to carry . Professor Newland m entions the messen­
ger as historical antecedent of today's clerk and notes the typical 
services  required . In one particular he refers to a messenger de­
scribed in a letter to Justice Gray as "the best servant I ever saw 
and withal a good barber. "97 
Today the law clerk's job has been formally bifurcated from 
that of messenger and even from the position of stenographic clerk. 
But the "baggage tasks" remain. In Michigan they were called "Sil­
ver Mercuries" after the judges' cars. There was even a trophy pre­
sented each week by the Chief Judge to the clerk who had gone out 
of his way to serve his judge . My best effort was to drive about 400 
miles to bring emergency motions to my judge. It was not good 
enough to take the trophy, however. Some clerks really put out-it's 
all part of the job. I remember washing my judge's car-I used his 
credit card-and, more curiously, the afternoon when in the middle 
of some research I was called to the bench during orals and handed 
a note by my judge that read : "We've been on the bench for almost 
five hours . I'm hungry. Get me a corned beef on rye. "  I did, and on 
my return the court took a short recess. ux Perhaps there is more to 
The d u ties of the " law assistants" of the Appellate Division of the New York Su prt'llll' Court 
a re described in D. KARLEN, supra note 84, at 18-19 .  
96. See note 1 2 4  and text accompanying notes 126 & 1 :27 i11fra. 
97. Letter from David Davis to Horace Gray. Dec. :20, I RR ! .  q1111t1•d i11 :\l•wland. su
wa 
note 1:!, at 300-0 1 .  
98 .  H a d  ,Judge Gillis also instructed me t o  find some precedent fo
r tht> rt>n•ss. t rnl' t 1 1  
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the notion of gastronomical j urisprudence than most p undits of the 
judicial process are willing to admit . 
From the history it  appears the law clerk always has been asso­
c iated with the secretarial side of the dichotomy-in the literal 
sense of the word. Again, the first official reference to the institu­
tion, Garland's re port, suggested to Congress that this new em­
ployee was "to be a stenographer . . . whose duties shall be to assist 
in such clerical work as might be assigned to him . "99 This sounds 
almost exclusively like the secretarial side of the job . The Attorney 
General continued however: 
The labor of the judges of the court in investigating questions and preparing 
their opinions is immense, and while the heads of Departments and Senators 
have this assistance, I do not think there is any good reason that the judges of 
this court should not also have it, and I therefore recommend that such provi ­
sions be made. 11•1 
This, by contrast, is the work more closely aligned with the law 
clerkship in the finest tradition of the institution.  Here Garland's 
words suggest participation by the clerk beyond the menial 
tasks-the barbering of the job . He anticipates the clerk serving his 
judge as an aid in research and in opinion writing . It is to these 
latter aspects of the job that any sketch of the law clerk's duties 
eventually turns, for here the clerk makes his most substantial con­
tribution to the administration of appellate justice. 
C. Research 
You should find the ensuing year full of legal research. What­
ever effort you put into the course at law school, or into the Review 
if you were a member, you will probably find mirrored in your work 
for the court, and this time on each appeal. The research required 
is monumental. To see where your case fits in, you often will find 
yourself tracing far back into the reports, sniffing out the birth, 
growth, and perhaps the demise of legal doctrine.  I m a de it as far 
back as 1 Michigan in the official reports-even further unofficially . 
All of this you must accomplish for yourself this time, without the 
aid of a casebook editor. But generally yours is the best library the 
I �£' posil ion of clerk. I could have. It seems that even at the Supreme Court of the United S1 all's there are 1.• m.es when hunger gets the best of the Justices. Attorney General Garland dPscnhes I hr confusion that resulted in the late nineteenth century when some of the Justices l l' f l  t h c  . .  h(•11rh to t a k e  t heir lunch behind the velvet curtain immediately to the rear of the l:ench. D1!nng l he hungry hours, argument had to proceed against the clatter of china." A. ( ,AIU.AN[), r.XPElm:Nn: IN  THF. lJNITF:ll STATES SUPREME COURT 63 ( 1898 ) .  !l!l. I HHf> An'v CEN. ANN. RF.P. 4 ::! ,  quoted i n  Newland supra note 13 at 301 J OO. Id. ' ' . 
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fresh graduate ever encountered . Barring some baggage task, I rec­
ommend that you spend your first hours at the court browsing 
through the library's titles . I had never heard of Appleman on Insur­
ance as a student, yet if you look you will discover it has 26 volumes. 
And it  is best to browse at the start of the job-it saves time and 
effort. I recall  learning of Appleman' s  treatise halfway through my 
first insurance appeal . And what about Cooley on Constitutional 
Lim ita tions ? I never had heard of Michigan's pre-eminent Chief 
Justice either, until working as a clerk. All students have heard of 
Casner's A m erican Law of Property. Even I had, although I had 
never leafed through it for fear of its size. But can you imagine, 
there is even a treatise on the Fundamentals of Hotel Law? Or on 
the Law of Sheriffs, Coroners, and Constables? All of these will 
become fam ous to you as clerk . Or infamous. 101 
In the grand tradition of the institution you should also find 
yourself writing the footnotes-like Dean Acheson, who served Jus­
tice Brandeis :  
He wrote the opinion; I wrote the footnotes. 
My footnotes up to that time were the Mount Everest of footnotes. Today, 
Justices of the Supreme Court write textbooks as marginal annotations of their 
opinion, but up to that time I had written the greatest footnotes, fifteen pages 
of footnotes. 
And what were we trying to do? We were collecting all the legislation and 
all the decisions of the forty-eight states and the Territories of the United 
States as to what was an intoxicating beverage. The purpose of this, of course, 
was to show that when Congress said "one half of one per cent of alcohol by 
volume is intoxicating," that that was reasonable, because all the states had 
said everything in the world beside that. And compared to the confusion of the 
states, this was Reason Incarnate. So I went to work on the opinion. 1112 
Wl . It was suggested to the new clerks that they obtain a copy of TATE & HEBERT'S, 
TREATISES FOR JuoGES ( 1971 ) ,  an accumulation of even the most esoteric titles. Reading i t  
tends to frighten the ordinary, unbibliographic mind. However, those who heard ,Justice 
Tate's presentation at the Institute would realize his is hardly the bibliographic mind. Per­
haps something of the "New Hampshire M ethod, "  see note 42 supra, is alive in Louisiana as 
well .  No doubt had Justice Tate touted his own book he would have added that good bibliog­
raphy is essential but not sufficient. See generally Tate, The Law-Makin!! Function of the 
Jud!(e, 28 LA. L. REV. 211 ( 1968) . 
1 02. Acheson, Recollections of Service with the Federal Supreme Court, 1 8  ALA. LAW. 
:35.� .  364-65 ( 1957) .  
Sometimes what is  said in the footnotes proves more important than the t ex t  o f  t he 
opinion itself. The best example is Justice Stone's famous Carolenf' Products foot not(' .  s,.,. 
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S.  1 44, lll2 n.4 ( 1 9:18) .  Hut i t  was probahl.v 
Stone himself who wrote the note. Nonetheless, it is i m portant to realize t hnt somet imes t h(• 
notes are just as potent as the body of the opinion . To the extent t hat t h e  clerks hnn• n hand 
in fashioning the footnotes. there remains a serious problem of delegat ion . See t ext acrnm pa ­
nyi ng notes J ll8 & lll9 infra. ,Justice Frankfurter, however. has rrit icized t h(' Court 's feint note 
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No doubt some of you will be sent by your judge to researc h the 
entire N ational Reporter System with the curious instruction , for 
i nstance, to am ass all the authorities demonstrating that when 
parties stipulate in their contracts that "time is of the essence, " 
they do not mean it, and even if they do, courts need not enforce 
the clause . '03 At least such were the judicial ways of Judge Charles 
Levin of the Michigan Court of Appeals, that court's prem ier foot­
notist. He even has his own trophy for it ,  given him by his colleagues 
on the bench. 104 
At first you may find these research demands strange . This is 
research like no other you have experienced. It follows the decision, 
not the other way round-you seek out precedent sustaining the 
judgment, not determining it. It is probably here, in the disquiet of 
initial research,  that the clerk first tastes the judicial process for 
himself. 
Finally, all this research inevitably nudges the clerk to side 
deliberations about the nature of the adversary system and about 
the functions of courts as well as his own. You will wonder whether, 
because of the weakness of the briefs, it  is the judge's job to protect 
the litigants. Is a State 's confession of error on a criminal appeal 
jurisdictional? Or is the court obliged on its own to scrutinize the 
record in the case and the applicable law in order to assure the 
validity of the concession? When the advocacy is all one -sided, is  it 
the judge's job to fill in the balance? 100 In this regard, a former 
Solicitor General of the United States, Erwin Griswold,  questions 
"whether the law clerks are in fact performing some of the aspects 
practice: "A footnote hardly seems to be an appropriate way of announcing a new constitu­
t ional doctrine . . . .  " Kovacs v.  Cooper, 336 U . S .  77,  90-91 (1949) (concurring opinion) .  
103. See, e.ff . Rothenberg v .  Follman, 1 9  Mich. App. 383, 172 N .W.2d 845 ( 1969 ) .  
104.  The idea was Judge Gillis's. The trophy is a framed piece o f  parchment covered 
with columns of asterisks, or "Ampernils" as they are designated on the award. An ampernil, 
according to Judge Gillis, is a nonsense word for footnote, signifying to the reader that he 
need not bother with the extensive marginal annotations so often appearing at the bottom of 
judicial opinions. especially those of Judge Levin. All of this naturally was meant in good fun . 
. J udge Levin, now a .Just ice of the Michigan Supreme Court, is highly regarded for his scholar­
sh ip  on the court-sometimes footnotes notwithstanding. Telephone conversation with Judge 
.John H. Cillis. Sept . 26. 1972. 
· 
IO:i. ( '{. R. PotJNll, APPELLATF. PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 381-82 ( 1941) :  
I know of one l'<>urt where it frequently happened that records were so confused and 
hrids so inadequate that  the court would depute one commissioner to  make a statement 
and argument for appt>llant and another to do the like for appellee. It is not often that 
('ourts art• so anxious to do exact justice to parties who do not present their cases as the) 
shou ld .  But PVl'n if a busy court cannot go so far, the waste of time in trying to disposi 
adPqua t l'ly o! a t·ast• inadequntl'ly presented is no small item in apportioning the energie 
of a l most an�· rl'\' l!'Wlllg court . 
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of the work t hat has tradit ionally been done by counsel . " '°6 Simi­
larly,  how free is t he clerk to suggest to his judge-and how free is 
the court-to rest the decision on a rationale unmentioned by the 
parties ? "" 
D. Writing 
From the very first reference to the office, 108 the literature al­
ways has focused on the draftsmanship of the clerk . How much 
writing is accomplished by the clerk? And how m uch is appropriate? 
At one extreme,  some judges permit nothing written by the clerk to 
appear in the opinion of the court . In some courts, the clerk is 
relegated to the job of snipping, rearranging, and pasting his judge's 
draft to provide m ore logic and flow. One of Stone's clerks recalls 
the cutting task this way: 
Accordingly, he directed his clerk to go through the opinion and outline the 
points, arranging them in a logical order. That done, and Stone having revised 
the outline, t h e  next job was to take the printed proof and a pair of scissors 
and arrange t h e  material according to the outline, deleting and where neces­
sary combining and rewriting, to remove duplications, and introducing each 
point by a topic or transitional sentence. 109 
In my case there was much writing. Happily for me, Judge 
Gillis was not a judge determined to place every comma or complete 
every sentence for h imself, although his was always the final draft. 
The experience is far more rewarding for the clerk this way, even if 
it mean s  enduring the pangs of his judge's criticism. Arguably it is 
also the more liberating for the judge, for he is then free for the 
harder task of judging. And that task of judging, as opposed to 
verbalizing the opinion, was never mine-either by statement or 
even by suggestion . Let me say categorically, as have other clerks 
unanimously before me, that the judgments were always Judge Gil­
l is ' s . 1  rn And t his sometimes required him to reject whole sent-
106. Griswold, Appellate Advocacy, 26 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 342. 353-54 ( 1971 ) .  
107. Cf. United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp. ,  410 U.S. 526, 574-7f'i ( 1 97:1) ( Rehn ­
qu ist .. J ., dissenting) ("For this Court to reverse and to remand for consideration of a possihlt• 
factual basis for a theory never advanced by the plaintiff is a drastic and unwarrn n t Pd 
depart ure from the most basic principles of civil litigation and appellate review. " ) .  
108. See text accompanying note 100 supra . , . .  1 09. McCorma ck, A Law Clerk 's Recollections, 46 CoLVM. L. R.F.v. 7 10 .  71 l ( l .l· l h l .  
l 1 0  S v.. te 30 at l 18·  "Even on t hose rare occasions wlwn t lw . ee, e.g. , rttANK , supra no ' ,  
. . 




U ge oes 
. . 
· . own vl'!;r "' 11 lnw l'i<•rk, or reverse, the Judges mvartably keep m their own hands · · · In my . · . 
d d · · and I had 11re!'lselv 1111 1 1 1 f l t1('l1<'(' "11 mv .Just ice made approximately one thousan ec1s10ns. · · . . 
ar;y of them . "  But see Rehnquist, notes 2 & 5 supra . SeP a lso text accompnn�·ing- 11
"1''' �111 & 
DJ s11pra . 
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ences-even words-from his clerks' tentative drafts. 
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It was my task nonetheless to prepare first drafts. At the begin­
ning of each monthly term of court, Judge Gillis would receive the 
call of next month's complement of cases, usually 2 1 ,  from the 
clerk's office, including the briefs in each case and the complete 
transcripts in the seven to ten cases he was assigned to write . The 
assignments were made pro rata by the Chief Judge among the 
panel's three judges. The next few days were ones of little communi­
cation between the judge and me. He would spend quiet, undis­
turbed hours either at home in his study or in the office, with the 
briefs of counsel and his case call. I was right in guessing that these 
were the hard hours of judgment . F inally , he would emerge from his 
s i lence and return with all the p apers, which then fell into my 
hands, save one-the case-call list . At this point it was my function 
to prepare seven draft opinions and to have them ready by the end 
of the month if at all possible . The task, at least at the outset, was 
the hardest I have ever faced. Judge Gillis had little time to instruct 
me ; he delegated the instruction to my predecessor in office, who 
unfortunately was too busy himself to temper the uncertainty that 
literally frightens one in the beginning. It is no light task to reach 
an informed conclusion of law on the facts and then to verbalize it 
as would Cardozo or Hand. I soon discovered there was hardly room 
for law as literature in Judge Gillis's office ; 1 t 1  there simply was too 
little time, although the office continued to make the attempt.  
This brings me to an important point. It is the only advice I 
insist you underscore with the student's nota bene. There is  a tend­
ency at the start of the job-call it "Treatise-itis" -for the clerk to 
incorporate all the law of search and seizure for instance in his first 
suppression draft. Perhaps this is inevitable . Neverth�less resist 
the temptation. The reports are full enough of reiterated law. 1 12 My 
own experience was to trace the law of search and s eizure from 
Harris to Rabinowitz to Chimel . 1 1 3  This was the fruit of my research. 
It
. 
toc�k almost a �eek of reading the cases. Naturally I thought all 
of . t�1s belon?ed m the opinion to reflect my efforts. Not Judge Gillis. And his, I am convinced, was the greater wisdom.  Treatises 
1 1 1 . Ser• /,nil' and Litrrature, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO 339 
( 1\1 .  H a l l  l'd .  1947 ) .  
1 1 :! .  Cf. Lu mbard . Current Problem" of the Federal Courts of Appeals, 5 4  CORNELL L. lh:v . :!!l .  ·IO 11 . 1 :, ( H J(i8) (judge usually expands the clerk's facts by about 100% and reduces 
l1 1s law h:-· ahout :,()"; ) .  
1 1 : 1 .  C ' hi mt•I v .  Cal ifornia , :191; U . S .  752 ( 1969) ; United States v. Habinowitz 339 U . S .  
,-,1; ( l ! t:,o i :  Ha rris \'. Uni ted St ates, il:1 1 U.S . 145 ( 1947 ) .  
' 
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have no place in appellate opinions, albeit too many are written that 
way. 1 1 1 Moreover, it was not Judge Gillis's institutional function to 
write treatises . H is was an intermediate appellate court where all 
appeals,  civil and criminal, are taken as of right. In such a forum, 
the cases do n ot warrant, nor does the case load perm it, seven trea­
tises a month . 1 1"  
I have mentioned the one paper I would never see, the monthly 
call list. I learned that on it Judge Gillis recorded his initial decision 
in each case, after reading the briefs of the parties and working alone 
on the matter. His annotations were quite simple:  A for affirmance, 
R for reversal ,  or dubitante when undecided. Sometimes he would 
ask me to read the transcripts in certain cases in the month ahead 
with an eye toward particular issues and to report my findings. But 
I never knew while working on the drafts whether my conclusions 
matched the A's or R's on the call list. Finally at the end of the 
month, Judge Gillis would leave his office for the hearing, often in 
another city, with his work product and mine in hand. Sometimes I 
1 14. B.E.  Witkin notes that the most consistent and sustained of all the complaints of 
critics, lay and legal, is that opinions are much too long. APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS, SYLLABUS 
53 (1966 ) .  See Gregory, Shorter Judicial Opinions, 34 VA. L. REV. 362, 364 ( 1948) ("The 
primary purpose of an opinion is to decide a case. It is not to expound legal p hilosophy or to 
be an ideal piece of legal l iterature. Nor is it necessary to exhaust all the law and cite all the 
cases . " ' ) ;  McComb, A Mandate from the Bar: Shorter and More Lucid Opinions, 35 A.B.A.J. 
382 ( 1 949) . 
1 15. If the court is an intermediate appellate court, its institutional function may 
preclude preparation of extensive opinions in a l l  cases. In such a forum, the immediate task 
at hand is the corrective one, that is, assuring that justice is done in each particular case. 
Broad declarations of policy are more appropriately left to the elaborate precedential function 
of the high court. See R. PouND, supra note 105, at 3-4;  8. WITKIN, supra note 1 14, at 17-19. 
See generally Joiner, The Function of the Appellate System, in JUSTICE IN THE STATES:  
ADDRESSES AND PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE JUDICIARY 97 ( 1971 ). 
The case of People v. Ramsey, 385 Mich. 221, 187 N.W.2d 887 ( 197 1 ), rev '{! 25 Mich. App. 
fi76, 181 N .W.2d 553 ( 1970), is illustrative. Ramsey's conviction for armed robbery was re­
versed hy the Michigan Supreme Court because the trial judge had looked at the prel iminary 
examination in the case, which had not been introduced as evidence. thus violating the 
accused's right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him . The Court of Ap­
peals had affirmed the conviction on the ground that, even assuming error, thi., defendant 
had not been prejudiced because a review of both the prelim inary examination t ranscript and 
I he t rial t ranscript. revealed no testimony given at the former hearing t hat was no! repea l ed 
at trial subject to confrontation and full cross-examination. This may very well have bri•n 
j u s t i ce in Ra msey's particular case, but what about good t rial practice in ! he criminal court s  
of t he St at e? Arguably, th is  was for the Michigan Supreme Court alone, in l ight of  i ts  <list incl 
i nst ii  ut ion al  role as fra mer of system-wide principles of general applicat ion. ,.;,.,. Huls l !'cill'r. 
N,.,,. litrJcks for Old Pvramids: Rrshapinp th1• Judicial Systrm . 44 S.  CAJ.. L. REV. !JO I .  9 1 1 1  
t l !l7 1 J .  And. indeed. the Supreme Cour t 's opinion i n  the case suggests a n  a pproach l rn nsc!'11 1 i ­
i n g  an.v l i m ited concern f o r  t h e  correctness o f  t he juclgmcnl below. Hnthc·r. t h!' courl 1 1n­
nou1wNI an absol u t e  rule of goocl criminal procedure. reg1udless of prejudin• 1 · 1 ·1 111111. nnd 
adopt(•d t lw prophyla c t ic of reversal to enforce it .  S1·1· :It!!'> M ich . nl :?:!!'>. J H7 !\' . \\" . :!d n t  �H!I_ 
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went along to tote the bags or was invited to hear the orals.  The 
anxious moment was the Judge's return home after the argument. 
It was then I first learned Judge Gillis' s view. If the judges were 
agreed on the judgment after their post-argument conference and if 
my draft was acceptable with some collegial retouching, then the 
case went down straight away. Those were proud moments for me.  
They were few, but they made the work, especially the evening 
work, all the more rewarding. Usually cases were held up, however, 
for further reflection among the panel and redrafting by the clerks. 
There were other occasions when I was not so fortunate, when the 
draft R simply didn't jibe with Judge Gillis's and the panel's A. On 
the Judge's return I was invited into chambers to argue the point, 
and argue I did, sometimes quite loudly . I only succeeded once, and 
that occasion was unusual because I received help from Judge 
Quinn, another Judge of the Court of Appeals. The panel was about 
to hear the case in Detroit. The question was the sufficiency of the 
evidence to prove an intent to steal;  the breaking and entering were 
conceded. In my view there was not enough, and I was called in on 
the matter by Judge Gillis, who had read my recommendation to 
reverse .  On arrival I received one of those substantive exposures 
that makes up the clerk's post-graduate legal education-on this 
occasion a fatherly discourse on circumstantial evidence. Judge 
Quinn dropped by and was asked his opinion; he was also on the 
panel . Judge Quinn's view matched mine for reasons he explained 
to Judge Gillis.  I must say I was rather piqued at how attentively 
my judge listened to Judge Quinn's view when he had rejected mine 
out of hand. But such was the nature of Judge Gillis's A ' s  when 
pitched against his clerks R's. And, reflecting on the point, the 
question of circumstantial evidence is one best remitted to the judg­
ment of experience, rather than to the theorizing of a fledgling law 
graduate . Judge Quinn had had quite a few years on the trial bench. 
On questions of theory, however, on those rare appeals raising 
matters res integra as he called them, Judge Gillis would always 
consult his clerks even if his views were somewhat fixed. Here theo­
rizing is useful, m and there is one concurring opinion in the Michi-
1 I G._ Earli
.
er in t he text it was suggested that a clerk's duties are often influenced by 
t ht> part intlar forum he serves. Perhaps it should be added that the clerk who works for an 
111t n111 ed1ate court of appeals makes a more substantial contri'but1·0 t d · · th . . . . , n owar improving e 
qual i t v  of appellat e  Judgments than his counterpart on a court of last resort. In cases reviewed 
h\' a su pn•rne cour t .  t he quest ions are often policy oriented wi' th ph'l h. I d 
· . . . . , , 1 osop ica an normative ovntonPs; since t he JUs t 1 ees
_ 
de term ine these questions for themselves, the utility of the law cl<>rk 1s less subst ant ial.  In rntermed1ate courts of appeals h th t '  1· , owever, e ques 10ns are o ten 
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gan Reports that represents the reciprocal work of judge and clerk 
in the grand tradit ion of the clerkship institution . 1 1 ; 
Finally on this writing point, what agony to redraft an opinion 
wholly the other way . Yet I assure you, you will discover that it can 
be done and almost always without sacrificing either the precedent 
or, indeed , even one's sense of what is right in the case . It was my 
function to verbalize my j udge's judgment. With his redrafting the 
task was complete . I thought it curious at first that each time I was 
assigned the task of writing full circle the other way I found it could 
be done, and done quite legitimately on the precedent and values 
involve d .  After enough of this I discovered first hand the teaching 
of the Bram ble Bush : 
[ It I is a mistaken idea which many lawyers have about it-to wit, the 
idea that the cases t hemselves and in themselves, plus the correct rules on how 
to handle cases, provide one single correct answer to a disputed issue of law. 
In fact the available correct answers are two, three, or ten. The question is: 
Wh ich of t he available correct answers will the court select-and why? For 
since there is al ways more than one available correct answer, the court always 
has to se lect . 1 "  
And almost a lways there inheres i n  the eventual adjudication a 
delicate balance: 
There is  in nearly every case an area of choice. How a judge marks out 
and determines that area largely determines the type of judge he is. In this 
area, most matters are ones of degree, ones of more or less. They are not black 
and white . 
. . . That is what judges are for. Within this area, it may not be possible 
to give a purely logical demonstration that one result is better than another. 
A judge has to call on all the resources of his experience and wisdom in coming 
to a conclusion. Some judges hew rather closely to the line; some are more free­
wheeling. 1 1» 
technical in nature, requiring just the kind of ski l l  the law clerk brings to the office. The range 
of the clerk's influence is thus expanded. Moreover, at the intermediate appellat.e level there 
is much more use for the creative suggestions of the law clerk about the ul t i mate disposition 
of the case. including modification of the judgment below, than at the supreme court . See 
M. SCHICK, LEARNED HAND'S COURT 107-08 ( 1 970). 
1 1 7. Harrison v.  Arrow Metal Prods. Corp., 20 Mich. App. 590, 616,  1 74 N . W.2d 875. 
888 ( 1 969 ) (Gil lis, J. ,  concurring) .  Recently the posit ion taken by .Judge Gillis in Harri8rm 
was finally adopted by the Michigan Supreme Court in Lowe v. Local 705. Hotel & Restaur­
ant Employees, 389 Mich. 123, 205 N.W.2d 167 ( 1973 ) .  It is probably typical for a clerk to 
I rave his judge and court with an especial fondness for one or 2 cases of signiticanre that arose 
rluring his tenure. See WILLISTON, supra note 17. at 256-58. 
I 18.  Llewellyn. Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the R11/ps or Canons 
A huu t How Statu tes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 396 ( 1 950) .  See f.!1•m·rally K. 
L1.r.wELLYN THE BRAMBLE BusH 62-63 ( 1 960) .  
1 1 9. Griswold, Earl Warren and the Supreme Court, Christian Science Monitor. De('. 
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Finally, I learned that "the rules change from case to case and are 
remade with each case . Yet this change in the rules is the indispens-. l 't f 1 " 120 able dynamic qua i y o aw. 
Had I not tasted the judicial process for myself I would only 
read these words as words, not for the important thoughts they 
surely are . Perhaps you have only heard them as words too . Read 
them anew at the end of your clerkship. You will have m ade a 
discovery of inestimable value to you later, as practitioner, profes­
sor, or whatever. It is a disclosure that the institution allows its 
clerks to retain as individuals, and you are privileged to m ake that 
discovery for yourselves. 
E. Internal Opera ting Proc edure 
This brings us back to the impact of a court's o perating proce­
dure on the shape of its clerks' duties . To reiterate : the tasks per­
formed by a law clerk often depend on the particular forum he serves 
and on its internal operating methods. Those who have surveyed the 
clerkship always make the point that the duties of a clerk depend 
primarily on the personal wishes of his judge . 121 Leach, who served 
Justice Holmes, tells us for example that early in Holmes's judicial 
career the petitions for certiorari, or "Petes for Cert" as Holmes 
called them, were always handled by the Justice himself, although 
he later adopted the practice prevalent among the other Justices of 
having his clerk prepare memoranda on such petitions. 1 22 If no cer­
tiorari petitions were ever filed in our prospective clerk's court, the 
question of an appropriate allocation of this task between judge and 
clerk would never arise. Thus there are institutional constraints at 
work here that must also be considered. The personal whims of 
judge alone are not entirely controlling. 
Some of the specifics should be obvious. Unless a clerk is work­
ing for a court whose jurisdiction is discretionary, he can never be 
asked to report on whether the court should take the case . If the 
court is an intermediate appellate court, the clerk' s  work will not 
include preparation of "cert memos." Rather, in such a forum all 
appeals are generally brought to the court as of right; there is no 
:!:\. l !lfi8. at 7.  col. fi, quoted in Stone, The Ratio of the Ratio Decidendi 22 M L R :i!li , () 1 8 - l !l ( l !lfi9 ) .  ' ODERN . EV. 
I �( ) ,  :.� · LEVI, A N  INTHO�>llCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 2 (1949) . 
. L l . .  Onl' characteristic common to the work of the clerks has apparently been t h a t  t lwir dut  H 's  haw been determined entirely by their individ I · t' " N  I d . . , ua JUS tees. ew an , supra note ! . \ ,  at . \  1 1  . .  'i1•1· also l l'Xl accompanying note 90 supra. 
l :!�- L<•ach.  s11pra note .S9,  at 1 2- 1 3 .  
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discretion to exercise.  The judge and his clerk must somehow face 
all cases al ike . 
In addition to these jurisdictional considerations there are less 
visib le  fac tors ,  i nternal to the court's operation, that affect the 
shape of the c lerk' s  function . To continue for the moment with the 
certiorari example,  even when the court's jurisdiction includes the 
discretionary grant, the law clerk may not find himself working on 
such petitions,  not because of the personal preferences of his judge, 
but on account of the operating methods of his court. To i l lustrate: 
several state courts of last resort whose jurisdiction is discretionary 
employ a staff wholly separate from the law clerks, usually commis­
sioners, to perform the certiorari or screening function . m Again, in 
such courts the clerk's duties would never include preparation of 
certiorari memoran da .  
The internal decision-making process o f  the appeals court also 
will affect its clerks' duties .  It used to be the general practice in 
appellate courts that the judges obtained their first knowledge of a 
case at oral argument.  The idea was for the judges to approach each 
case with an open mind and without any view of the merits .  Today, 
although there may be exceptions, the standard practice is for the 
judges to apprise t hemselves before oral argument of the nature of 
the appeal and of the issues presented. m Immediately after the orals 
123. For example, the Michigan Supreme Court uses commissioners to review all appli· 
cat ions for leave to appeal, to prepare a digest of the facts, and to make recommendations 
on disposition of the applications. COUNCIL, supra note 38, Table XIII, at 76; see The Office 
of Commissioner of the Michigan Court of Appeals and Its Role in the Appellate Process, 48 
F'.R.D. 355 ( 1970 ) .  See generally AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, SOLUTIONS FOR APPELLATE 
CouRT CONGESTION AND DELAY, Infor. Sheet No. 24, at 8-9 ( 1963); Lilly & Scalia, Appellate 
Justice: A Crisis in Virginia ? ,  57 VA. L. REv. 3,  3 1 -34 ( 1971).  
1 24. The judges generally learn of the case by reading the briefs and sometimes the 
record on appeal. M. SCHICK, supra note 1 16, at 90-91; see Hopkins, Small Sparks from a 
Lou· Fire: Some Refiections on the Appellate Process, 38 BROOKLYN L. REV. 551,  567 ( 1972) 
("A 'hot' court-that is  one that is familiar with the facts and questions in the appeal before 
argument-is notably better equipped to stimulate a more effective discussion between the 
court and counsel a n d  to narrow the issues .")  . .  Justice Tate informed me that at t he first 
Int ermed iate Appellate Judges Seminar in 1959 only 2 out of 20 judges made it a sta ndard 
pract ice to study the briefs and record in advance of the orals in the case. Today, appl' l late 
judges almost unan i mously read the briefs of the parties before oral argument . lnt ervi�w wit h 
.Justice Albert Tate, Jr.,  in Baton Rouge, Sept. l, 1972. 
Sometimes allegiance to the older practice of approaching each appeal "cold . "  t hnr is. 
w it hou t. any prior knowledge of the case, moves a senior judge to chast ise nn upstar1 juni"r 
who comes prepared for the orals. Judge Medina descri bes his fi rst day on t hl' Sl•cond C i rc u i t  
a s  follows: 
I could hardly wait to be up there on the bench listening to t he ari.:unH•nls.  S" I mul 
all  t h e  briefs and what we call appendices in t he cases coming up for ar).(unwnt . nncl "n 
I he bif.( day I marched up to the bench from t h e robing room at I ht• l'IHI 111" t lw prllct·ssinn. 
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or in some jurisdictions before the argument, a conference of the 
judges is held at which a tentative decision is reached in the case . 
Typical of these conference systems is that described by .Judge Mol­
inari in his article The Decisionmaking Conference  of the Ca liforn ia 
Court of Appeal. 12" Judge Molinari notes that the success of the 
system depends on the strength of the calendar memoranda 1 2i; pre ­
pared in the cases and written, where the conference system is em­
ployed, by the law clerks. These are the bench m emos, or prehearing 
memoranda. The important point here is that when a court is com­
mitted by its internal operation to preparation in advance of the 
orals, its clerks' duties are shaped accordingly . S hould the prospec ­
tive law clerk be destined to s erve such a forum-known as a "hot 
court" in the jargon of judicial administration-he will probably 
spend many hours preparing these prehearing report s . 12i 
An emerging ideal now exists in the forefront of appellate court 
administration, an ideal that eliminates standardized, undi fferen­
tiated treatment of all appeals. 1 28 The principal rationale of this 
development is that with differentiation , with a screening mech­
anism "separating the wheat from the chaff and treating each ac­
cordingly, " 12!1 there comes a liberation of the judges for the better 
performance of their duties , together with an improvement in the 
with a pile of briefs and appendices under my arm. To make mat ters worse, I asked a 
number of questions during the arguments . At the end of the session we returned to the 
robing room and one of the older judges sai d :  "Trying to impress the populace, I see . "  
That was shock number one. Surely a judge h a s  the right t o  read the briefs and records 
in advance of the arguments, if he chooses to do so, and he has the right to ask quest ions . 
too1 
Medina, supra note 82, at. 1 48-49. 
125. 57 CALIF. L. REV. 606 ( 1969) .  
. 
1 26.  "This memorandum, which is prepared by one of the judges in conjunction with 
his  law clerk, consists of_a detailed statement of the facts in the case (with transcript refer­
ences), t
.
he content10ns of the parties, an analysis of the cases and authorities relied upon by 
t he parties, and the results, if any, of independent research. When completed this memoran­
dum 18 dtstnbuted to each of the judges, together with copies of the briefs . "  Id. at 608. 
127 .  The jarg�n should be changed to read "boiling court" instead. Justice Tate cor­
rected my usage, pomtmg out that in a " hot court" the judges prepare themselves in advance 
for t.h
.
e argument, but only by reading the briefs and sometimes the record on appeal The 
addition of a prehearing report and d · 
. 
d h 
a propose memorandum opinion in the case if war-
rante -t e so-called "Michigan pla " k" di . h .. . ., 
n -serves to m e the degree of preparedness; the 
� '.'��7�. en boils, so to speak. Interview with Justice Albert Tate, Jr., in Baton Rouge, Sept . 
l 28. See 11enerallv Baier & Lesinski / A ·d f h J · · Curricular and Stude ·1 I . / 
' 11 1 0 t e udicial Process: A Proposal for Law 
n nvo uement, 56 JUDICATURE 100 104 ( 1972) I :W . Letter from .Judge Carl M cGowen to p f 
' : . 
Shafrot h, Surl'ev of thl' United States C t f A
ro essor Paul Carrmgton, July 15, 1966, m 
· 
· 
· our s o ppeals, 42 F.R.D. 243, 313 ( 1968) . 
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quantity and quality of appellate justice . This ideal is best illus­
trated by the internal operations of C hief Judge Lesinski's court in 
Michigan, a court n ationally respected for its development of effec­
tive screening techniques. 1:io 
In the Michigan Court of Appeals a staff of professional em­
ployees,  the Pre-Hearing Division, exists entirely separate from the 
law clerks. Its principal function i s  threshold scrutiny of all appeals 
in order to sift out those that can be disposed of by a short per 
curiam opinion.  The Division utilizes a pool of specially trained 
"Research Attorneys" to prepare prehearing reports on all appeals. 
These reports are like those usually prepared in other jurisdi ctions 
to apprise the court of the nature of the appeal, but unlike other 
jurisdictions they are not the work of the law clerks. 13 1  As a result 
of this refinement of internal operations, I never personally prepared 
a prehearing memo.  Rather, a report from the Pre-Hearing Division 
accompanied the briefs and record in e ach case when Judge Gillis 
turned it over to m e .  It was then my custom if time allowed to work 
on each appeal without reference to this report . After forming my 
own views of the case I would check them against the recommenda­
tions of the report . Such a system, where it exists, offers the judge 
a built-in m ethod of checking the recommendations of his clerk. 
V. VALUE OF THE CLERKSHIP 
What a bout the value of the institution itself to the clerks? 
What does the l a w  clerk carry with hi m-this time in his own 
bags-as he leaves the court? We have already brushed over some 
of the more important points. To emphasize them again: During his 
stay, the research required for the job will expose the clerk to wide 
areas of substantive law, and there are occasions when the judge 
himself will likely take the time to fill in some of the gaps. This is a 
fine post-graduate education; much is learned about appellate pro­
cedure. For instance, nothing is really extraordinary about a writ of 
prohibition or superintending control until the clerk sees a trial cut 
short for himself. Sometimes all this exposure prompts the clerk to 
write his own treatise, or at least a practice manual, on the appellate 
i :io. See Christian, supra note 47, at. 60: .Jun1c1AL COUNCii. OF CALIFORNIA , i9i0 Rt:rot<T 
TO THF. GOVF.RNOR AN!l THE LF.GISLATIJRE 24-26, :14-:l!i. 
1 : \ 1 .  Se1• uenerallv Lesinski & St.ockmeyer. !'rl'hl'aring Resf'art'h and Scri·1 ·11ing in till' 
!'vfiC'higun Court "! Appeals: One Court 's Meth1Jd f1Jr /n,.rcasing J11dicial H'<1d11ct i1 ·ity. �fi 
v AN!l. L. REV. 1 2 1 1  ( 1 97:! ) ;  Lesinski, Re."•arch Assistants: Thi' Michigan r:.1p1'rl l ' / 1 1 " 1 ' ,  J I )  
.Junr.r.s' .J . !i4 ( 1 97 1 ) .  
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process. m The more nostalgic clerks are satisfied to reminisce about 
their work, purporting all the while to study the clerkship as an 
institution. After a year of reading briefs, the clerk is probably a 
better brief writer for it. He will have heard good orals and bad and 
probably knows the difference for himself now. And from all the 
transcripts he may even have learned something o f  good trial prac-
tice. 
But there is exposure of a different kind too. It has nothing to  
do with substantive law, or  even with the substance of appellate 
procedure . Rather, you come face to face with the sublime truths of 
this law job. Dean Acheson did,  working for Justice Brandeis : ' ' .Jus­
tice is a method; justice is a m ethod by which results are reached. 
And when that method is followed . . .  then you have Justice as 
perfect as man can ever give . " i:i:i Again, after your clerkship you will 
recognize these words for the m agnificent insight they are.  
There is the important lesson of the Bramble Bush in the clerk­
ship. We have already mentioned thisY14 I would sketch in a further 
emphasis, however. To those of you who will serve an intermediate 
appellate court, yours is the better tier from which to learn t he 
secrets of the judicial process. At the least you will be the better 
opinion reader because of it. After you have sweated through the 
briefs of counsel and the record in the case for yourself, after your 
judge has weighed all the nuances in the balance and the opinion is 
out, keep your eye on how the case is handled On High. The view is 
irresistible.  A proud moment comes if further review is denied, but 
the apocalypse comes the other way round, after the grant of review 
and reversal. Read the final opinion slowly, carefully . After your 
work you are in a position like few others to test the legitimacy of 
the final articulation. And it may come as a surprise at first to see 
whole lines of argument passed over by the high court. All the good 
intermediate handiwork, all the precedent culled from the reports, 
may very well be ignored . It rests forgotten on the shelf. That, you 
will learn, is the privilege of final judgment. And the discovery is 
exhilarating. It makes teachers of us all. 
Finally, the clerk leaves the court with an especial fondness for 
his judge . He has come to know him as a man now and as a friend .  
Recent�y on 
.
Justice Harlan's death, one clerk expressed the feelings 
that stick with you after you leave your judge : 
I :i2. See. e.g . .  R. ROBERTSON & F KIRKHAM J · 
, URISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE llNITF.D STATF.S (2d ed.  R. Wolfson & P. Kurland 1951) .  
1 :1: 1 .  Ache�on, .�upra note 102,  a t  366. 
I :14. Sr•1• note 1 18 supra and accompanying text. 
19/:J J PROFILE OF AN INSTITUTION 1 163 
[ W l hen I saw t he .J ustice recently in his hospital room, and he spoke to me 
even in his discomfort with a warmth and lilt that showed he was ready once 
again to give of h i mself, t he bonds of affection that have been building through 
t he years of our acquaintance were brought suddenly to tension and pressed 
me to tears for this estimable man. m 
Reading this, any clerk who has been through it for himself might 
very well share those tears. 
VI. LAW CLERK AS JUDGE: THE DELEGATION QUESTION 
In the end we return to the delegation question: Is it possible 
that the institution has usurped its master's function? Has the law 
clerk become the judge? The inquiry seems inevitable whenever the 
conversation turns to the law clerk. The only answer, it seems to me, 
must rest more on faith than on anything concrete, 136 although there 
is room enough for some hard analysis of the issue. Those who would 
insist on proofs about the matter will never be satisfied. 
As put, the question has the clerk become the judge appears a 
bit broad for intelligent response. A narrower, more profitable line 
would first ask : Are there any tasks at all that can be delegated to 
the clerks without infringing the integrity of the judicial process? 
Take baggage toting for instance. Surely even the most zealous 
guardian of the judicial function would agree there is nothing judi­
cial about the clerk's carrying of the bags. But what of the other 
tasks performed by the clerks as we move up from secretary? What 
of those tasks generally associated with the grander tradition of the 
clerkship institution? 
There is much reading in this clerking business. '37 Yet it is hard 
to see how a judge is less a judge merely because he makes good use 
of his clerk's eyes, as well as his legs. Transcripts on appeal are often 
quite thick• :ix and if the question, for example, is the sufficiency of 
i:t'i. Nesson, Mr. Ju.�tice Harlan, 85 HARV. L. REV. 390, 391 ( 1971 ) .  
t :l6. A legal philosopher might very well say the sa�e th.ing for .justice its�lf. Indeed. 
Morris Cohen has written, "That in the long run justice will triumph in the law is a matter 
of fai th  not of knowledge . "  M. COHEN, Mv PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 41 ( 1941 ) .  
t :l7. Delmar Karlen's description of the work o f  t � e  law assis�ants a t  t��.
App.ellate. Division of t he New York Supreme Court provides some figures on this acc.oun
t. In view of 
t he fact t hat  the briefs in a typical appeal are likely to run 50 to 60 pages in length an� the 
h · b f ely studving the papers submit ted renird on appeal another 350 or 400 pages, t e JO o mer · . · 




· h t h d t be read from front to back on nn rnns1sted of 1 1 43 pages of trial transcript t a a o . . 
al legat ion of insufficiency of the evidence to warrant submission of a �egl�gence q�e�t ion to · d · t that a Sixth C1rcmt clerk m Detrmt t h e  jurv .  Simi larly, the rumor circulate m our cour . . h had be�n assigned the task of wading through 1 1  v?lumes of tnal transrnpt to a�sur
e t e 
s u f fic.:iencv of the evidence to prove a criminal conspiracy· . . h • 11 · d curs upon \·1ewrng t e J:l8. "One of the sighs frequently exhaled by appe ate JU ges oc · 
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the evidence to prove elements of the crime, t hey m ust b e  read from 
front to back, a task of no slight p hysical e ffort . If the  clerk con­
cludes that the evidence is sufficient, his judge can st i l l  test t he 
validity of this conclusion against the specifi cs of the  clerk's memo­
randum-those pages of testimony said by the clerk t o  permit the 
jury to find the necessary elements. Nonetheless, som e critics would 
insist that the judge read every page for himself. No doub t there are 
some appellate judges who make it a point of honor to scrut inize t he 
entire transcript, at least in criminal cases. But scrutinize for what? 
Appeals, even criminal appeals, require allegations of error; and 
when an allegation directs the court's attent ion to the instruct ions 
only, what need is there to examine the uoir dirr? ? Those few cases 
in which broad inspection would disclose plain error might not war­
rant the time. 139 Furthermore, institutional considerat ions might cut 
the other way; is it  the court's function to notice error not raised by 
counsel on appeal?un All of this might even sugges t  leaving the job 
of discovering p lain error to the law clerks. But t o  ret urn to the 
allegation of instructional error, is it really a threat to t h e  judicial 
function to allow the clerk to read the transcript and to report to 
his judge that the case was not tried to the jury with bad instru c­
tions, but to the court with none at all? I have discovered such a 
case in the reports. 14 1  Admittedly, such a gross aberration of appel­
late advocacy is rare, but the pattern of alleging error unsupported 
in the record is not an infrequent one . To use one judge's c haracteri ­
zation, many appeals, particularly criminal appeals, " m elt when 
mass of papers composing the record on appeal . "  Hopkins, supra note 124, at  iJ6:1. 
139. Some jurisdictions have statutes or court rules expressly or by cons! ruction allow­
ing appellate courts sua sponte to notice plain error, that is, error manifest on the face of the 
record itself. See, e.g. , 28 U . S . C .  § 2106 ( 1970 ) ;  FED. R. CRIM. P .  52( b ) .  Thus in t hese 
jurisdictions appellate courts are at least empowered to notice plain error without assignment 
by counsel on appeal. Whether as a matter of policy these same courts should make it 
standard practice to search every record for such error is another question, however. Perhaps 
the doctrine is, or should be, limited to saving appellate counsel from omissions at trial, at 
least when the point is sufficiently raised on appeal. 
In addition some courts hold that it is within their inherent judicial power to notice plain 
error. See, e.g. , People v.  Dorrikas, 354 Mich. 303, 316, 92 N . W . 2 d  305, 307 ( 1958) ("The 
mhe�ent P?wer of this Court to prevent fundamental injustice is not limited by what appel­
lant is entitled to as a matter of right.") ; accord, State v.  Garcia, 19 N . M .  4 1 4 ,  143 P. 1012 
( 1914) (on reheari.ng) . See generally R. POUND, supra note 105, at 86, 1 3 1 ,  
185-86. 
, 
140. There is the strict view that unassigned errors will not be considered on appeal. 
State v · .Burns, 82 Conn. 213, 219, 72 A. 1083, 1085 ( 1909) ("[The court] cannot be expected to examme several ?ages of evidence and numerous exceptions in a search for errors which 
counsel have not pomted out either in their appeal or their argument." ) .  See generally 5 AM . 
. JuR. Appeal & Error § 654 (1962 ) .  
1 4 1 .  People v.  Smiley, 17 Mich. App. 351, 169 N.W.2d 515 ( 1969 ) .  
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the records are opened to the l ight of day."142 When this is the case 
the situation i s  especially amenable to preliminary screening b; 
nonjudicial personnel rather than by the judge . To put it simply, 
there is little reason why a j udge's time should be spent wading 
through thick transcripts to verify the record basis of assignments 
or al legations of error. 
What a bout research? Is this reading different in kind? I doubt 
it. There is  the suggestion today that all legal research be computer­
ized to facilitate both advocacy and judgment.143 Yet no one has seen 
a threat to the integrity of the courts in this. The same is true of 
the clerk's legal research. It is just too hard to imagine Justice 
Brandeis himself-rather than h is c lerk-researching every page of 
the United States Reports looking for that particular point.144 A 
judge's  time chart simply won't allow it, 145 and, one suspects, Jus­
tice Brandeis probably had little pause about delegating the job to 
his clerk anyway. 
We reach writing. What about the judge who turns to his clerk 
for first drafts? Is he less faithful to his office for it? This aspect of 
the delegation calculus is more troublesome; an analysis of the point 
proves more involved. First, it is no answer to say that the judges 
are unable to write for themselves in every case because of the press 
of time.  This may be true, but it has nothing to do with our norma­
tive inquiry. If by allowing his clerk to write a judge pro tanto 
abdicates his office, then we should have more j udges, fewer clerks, 
and no drafts at all .  Nor can we condemn the practice simply be­
cause some of our noblest judges would have none of it. Justice 
Holmes, for example, never allowed his clerk to turn a Holmesian 
phrase, or even to try. With Holmes the clerk's job was to fill the 
opinion with citations of Holmes's favorite author, meaning Holmes 
himself. 14'' S imilarly, try to discern any of the clerk's handiwork in 
the orchestrations of Justice Musmanno. Still, these same judges 
must be asked why they refuse to allow their clerks to prepare the 
drafts. Unless the reasons given for the refusal relate to the scope 
of the judicial function, no inference about the legitimacy of the 
1 42 .  Letter from ,Judge Albert Bryant t o  Will  Shafrot h . .  Jan . 19, 1 9fi7. i n  Shnfrot h. 
S11n·1•,· of the United States Courts of Appeals, 42 F .H.D.  :14:l, :l 1 4  ( HJfi7 ) .  S1•1• also Hr.vnn. 
Fur u .Swifter Crim inal Appeal-To Protect the Pu nlic as Well as the A ('nm·d. :1fi WASH. & 
L�;f; L. Rr.v. 1 7fi ( 1968 ) .  
1 4:l. .'i<'e McCabe, A utomated f,e{ial Research. f,4 .Jun1rATt'HP. :11tl ( 1 !17 1 ) .  
I ·14 . "'"'' text accompanying not e 90 wpm .  
_ . .  
l ·l!"i. :-;,.,. Hart ,  Fureword: Time ('hart of the 0fustic1"'· Till' Suprl'/111 '  ( 'uurt . l .'bli / r 'l"l'1 , 
/:l HAHV. L. Rr.v. 84 ( 1 9!">9) .  
l ·Hi. S1•1• Len ch.  supra not e !"i9. at 1 : 1 .  
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delegation is permissible either way. In Holmes's case, w and surely 
in Musmanno's, the reason for the refusal is pride of authorship.  
There are judges who like to write for themselves because to them 
the opinion rings true only when cast in their own language. One 
wonders about the judgment, however. Pride of authorship and the 
judicial office may not run along mutually inclusive lines . Is a deci ­
sion any less a judicial pronouncement because the clerks had a 
hand in the explication? Perhaps it is significant on this point that 
nowhere in the literature has a judge taken the position that his 
exclusive authorship is essential to the integrity of the judicial of­
fice. Some judges come very close however. The views of Judge 
Edwards of the Sixth Circuit are illustrative: 
Law clerks are the most obvious aid to time- pressed appellate j udges. I 
use the two which the federal government now allows me to save time in every 
way I can think of consistent with judicial duty. But no law clerk has ever-or 
will ever-write an opinion for me. And I likewise reject the incorporation in 
an opinion of language from any law clerk memorandum. If I write a sentence 
I know for certain what I mean. If I copy a sentence, I am by no means so sure . 
And I believe lawyers and litigants are entitled to judicial opinions. iJx 
Certainly in these words there is at least the suggestion, if not 
an assertion, that writing is for the judge and that copying even a 
sentence of the clerk's memorandum is inconsistent with judicial 
duty. And this time the reason assigned for the refusal has nothing 
147. "I  have been asked whether I ever wrote an opinion for the Justice. The answer is 
an emphatic NO.  He had a great pride in his highly individual literary style and any measure 
of ghost-writing would have been abhorrent to him." Id. 
148. Edwards, The A voidance of Appellate Delay, Panel Discussion, in Improving Pro­
cedu res in the Decisional Process, 52 F.R.D. 51 ,  68 (emphasis added ) .  Nonetheless, Judge 
Edwards gives his clerks substantial work to do. His description continues: 
But my clerks live with the cases assigned to me in much the same way I do. I never 
encourage their recommending any disposition in preliminary work on a case. But I do 
require them to write a prehearing memo on each case and after assignment of a case to 
me for opinion writing, I may assign specific legal issues for in-depth research. I encour­
af(e them at this point to think toward disposition-and freely to argue for whatever 
point of view they may come to. 
Id. 
.Judge Learned Hand, who called the law clerks "puisne judges" (see Kurland Jerome 
N. :·rank: Som :  Reflections an
.
d Recollections of  a Law Clerk, 24 U. CHI. L.  REV. 
'
661, 663 
( 19.17) ), also refused to allow his clerks to write even a sentence : "[He] wouldn't even let a 
law derk write a sen�ence, not one sentence. He would let the law clerk criticize. He would 
hand what he had written to the law clerk and let him make all th t. h d . . . e sugges ions e wante to makr. Hut not one word of that opinion was anybody else's b t L d H d' 
" M d' 
'/'/ [) · . / . . 
u earne an s. e ma 
II' l'!'l.'111/ln l'rocrs.� In the United States Court of Appe l s d c ·  . H h
' 
. . . 
· a s, econ ircwt- ow t e Wlu·l'ls (,u Round lns1de-w1th Commenta"'' Address befo N y k C . . , . ' .J • re ew or ounty Lawyers' Assoc1at 1nn f orum Evening, Apr. 26, 1962 (typewritten) at 27 d · M 
not l' 1 1 11. at 107 n.9:1. 
' ' quote in . SCHICK, supra 
19731 PROFILE OF AN INSTITUTION 1167 
· at all to do with pride of authorship .  Rather, a judge should write 
for himself because only then can he know for sure what he means. 
But I wonder whether Judge Edwards is really serious about this 
reasoning . Surely he is not so poor a student of the legal process to 
think that lawyers and litigants read judicial opinions according to 
what they think the judge intended. Any private unexpressed mean­
ing of the j udge is institutionally irrelevant. The opinion is read 
instead by reference to what it says ; indeed it should be read only 
that way. To illustrate : Lord Nottingham once stated his was the 
better construction of the Statute of Frauds because, "I had some 
reason to know the meanings of this law ; for it had its first rise from 
me. " 1�!1 Yet, as has been pointed out, this view is quite erroneous : 
" If Lord Nottingham drew it, he was the less qualified to construe 
it, the author of an act considering more what he privately intended 
than the meaning he has expressed." 150 Thus one might argue that 
the very reason tendered by Judge Edwards for rejecting his clerk's 
handiwork cuts in precisely the opposite direction. The young law 
graduate fresh from Legal Writing or the Review might be the one 
ideally qualified to mesh what his judge means with what the opin­
ion says . 1 5 1  And this might even include an occasional Musmanno 
opm1on . 
What then remains of Judge Edwards's view? I suspect he 
has already heard of Lord Nottingham, and if not he would probably 
adhere to h is own beliefs at any rate. There is just something intui­
tive, he would say, that tells him he must write his own opinions. 
Again, nothing concrete seems in the offing on this point. I can only 
add my own remaining intuitions. 
It seems to me too easy an answer to suggest that so long as the 
judge decides the case there is no delegation of the judicial function 
149. Ash v. Abdy, 36 Eng. Rep. 1014 (Ch.  1678). 
150. 4 J. CAMPBELL, LIVES OF THE LORD CHANCELLORS AND KEEPERS OF THE GREAT SEAL 
OF ENGLAND 228 n.3 ( 1885) .  I owe the reference to Professor Lon Fuller, who first put all these 
thoughts into my head. See L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 86 n.41 (rev. ed.  1969) . I have 
a lways thought, however, that if one has enough sense to recall these things on his own, he 
can right.fully claim them for himself. So did Llewellyn. See K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE 
Bl!SH 8 ( 1930). 
! il l .  "I Llawyers looking for all shades and nuances of meaning read t.he judge:s words 
w i t h a magnifying glass. A well-trained law clerk, especially one w.
ho .has had
 cons1dernhl1· 
law journal experience, can aid his judge in polishing the language of op1111ons and Ill spoU inJ! 
a mbiguities and other slips that may return to plague the court later. Even n Judge who is n 
precise and clear d rafter can use an editor, for the best of us can be misled h� our own words 
a nd feel sure that. what is crystal clear to us is equally clear to all who read.  Hrnckn . ·'ll/Jrll 
nute 48. at 297-98. 
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in the draftsmanship of the clerk. 152 Just what is a decision in a case 
anyway, if not the opinion itself? Is it so clear that the court's 
opinion is severable from its judgment? Perhaps the nature of the 
judicial process is su ch that judgment emerges only as the opinion 
is written. More than enough students of the law, even the j uris­
prudes, have had trouble keeping the conc;epts of decision, opinion, 
and judgment straight and clear of each other . 1 ":1 Their borders are 
too impalpable, too plastic; these concepts shade into one another. 
Accordingly, the solution that writing is not judging seems to me too 
facile. It is at least possible, then, to talk sensibly about whether a 
clerk should be allowed to prepare the drafts, acknowledging this 
time that some of his sentences m ay come close to the ratio, 1 " 4  to 
the heart of the judicial process itself. This, as best I can put it, is 
what may very well be bothering those who intuitively would insist 
that the judge write it all for himself. 155 
Yet even with the inquiry thus redrawn we can proceed along 
analytical lines only one step further. The rest is all a m atter of 
faith . There are sentences, and there are sentences. Some are like 
baggage toting-they can be drafted by the clerk and incorporated 
into the opinion without endangering the judge 's integrity, qua 
judge . Other sentences, however-indeed even a naked word-may 
commit the court along paths of law the judges themselves are un­
willing to travel . These are the sentences that strain the legitimacy 
of the writing delegation the hardest. Let me flesh in all this disquis-
152. Albeit this is the answer generally given in the literature. See, e.g. , M. SCHICK, 
supra note 1 16 ,  at 107: "Law clerks probably exaggerate their influence because most of them 
do in fact draft some opinions; they fail to recognize that this is not the same as deciding the 
outcome of appeals." 
153. Cf. L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW 92-93 (1968 ) ;  Cohen, Transcendental Nonsen8e 
and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 844 (1935); Frank, What Courts Do in 
Fact, 26 ILL. L. REv. 645, 657 (1932). 
154 .  The jurisprudes also have been confused about just what this term means. See 
Goodhart '. The Ratio !Jecidendi of a Case, 22 MODERN L. REv. 117  ( 1959); Simpson, The Ratio 
lJec1dend1 of a Case, id. at 453; Stone, The Ratio of the Ratio Decidendi, id. at 597. Cf, Cohen. 
supra note 153, at 844 n.82. 
. J .'i:'i . At the Institute Judge Jack Day of the Ohio Court of Appeals opened his presenta-
t ion with  the remark that he never allows his clerk to draft opinions for h i m .  I later asked 
why. and he suggested that, indeed, to him writing is judging and that sometimes draftsman­s�1p
_ 
m�y come too _clo�e to judg_ing. For this reason he prefers to keep all the writing to h 1 1nself . w1t hou
_
t belitt h�g thos_




an �ncons1stency m his position, however, since he requires his clerk to prq>are t h e  hrst �ralt of the Syllabus in each case, which in Ohio alone is the law. Judge Day delegat es this task. however because he puts Oh1"o's Syllab t .  · h . , us prac ice m t e same cat ef.(or�' as loothall. Telephone conversation with Judge Jack G. Day, Sept. 20, 1972. See r 1 1 1 1l' fiH suprn. 
1973 1 PROFILE OF A N  INSTITUTION 1169 
ition with some specifics. What harm to the judicial process to allow 
the clerk to state the facts? Any first-year student knows the facts 
are not the law. What harm to allow the clerk to state in a draft that 
the action is one ex contractu, o mitting Mrs. Quickly's details about 
the white hat and sea-coal fire? 156 Yet there is controversy even here. 
It was Justice Holmes himself, I think, who said that if permitted 
to state the facts, judgment in his favor would necessarily follow. 157 
Passing over this difficulty, think of the con_stitutional judgment 
implicit in the single word "penumbra . " 158 I know it was Justice 
Holmes who said that words are not like crystals, forever unchanged 
and transparent. A word "is the skin of a living thought. "1 59 And the 
thought may prove more law than literature. 
If all of what I have said is true, then as an abstract m atter as 
well as a day-to-day reality there would appear nothing wrong in the 
draftsmanship of the clerk, 1 60 provided the judge has the good sense 
to retouch the draft to eliminate any sentences or words not to his 
liking. And the retouching process is essential-it not only protects 
an individual interest in style, but it also guarantees the judge's 
fidelity to law. It determines whether the course of judicial duty will 
run straight and true. It is precisely here that one must abandon 
further analysis and rest final opinion on faith alone : can the judges 
be trusted to weed out any writing that smacks of judgment? 
l fi6 .  See O.W. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 168 
( 1 920) .  
J.57. Cf- Llewellyn, Law and the Modern Mind: A Symposium , 3 1  COLUM. L .  REv. 82, 
8:i ( 1 9:) 1 ) :  
The Judge's selection, stress and arrangement of "the facts" can m a ke the most 
peculiar case look l ike routine. We know from l i fe that most cases are, before this fact­
manipulation begins, peculiar. Manipulation-nay, perception-of "the facts" is all­
i mportant.; j udges, like witnesses, observe d ifferently according to temperament and 
circumstances_ Judges read the evidence they get with an eye to their views of just ice: 
"t he facts" t.ake shape in court in the light. of the resu lt to he achieved. 
Perhaps the i m portance of this fact perception is what .Judge Medina of t h e  Second 
C ircu i t  had in m i n d  when he explained his refusal to allow his clerks to st a t e the far t s  on 
a ppl'a l :  "I do not believe [ th a t l  is the kind of t h ing you can turn over t o  a law dt>rk who 
has not had ex perience appraising facts." Medina, The /)ecisinnnl f'rnC'I'-'" in th 1 • I !nit 1 ·d 
Stal l's Co u rt of A pp1•als, Second Circu it-Ho11• the Whel'ls (;11 f{u u n d  lnsid1· ·- ll' il h  
Cr111w1 1•n tnrv. Address before New York Coun ty Lawyers' Associat ion Foru m E\'C'n i ng. Apr.  
:.!Ii. l !lli2 ( t y;iPwri t t en ) , at 22,  qu11t1•d in M .  SCHICK, .mprn not e I Hi. nt I O!i. 
l f1H_ 81•1• Cri swolcl v .  Conncc t i rn t ,  :lR I U .S .  479. 4H4 ( Wfif >l .  
l fi!I_ Towne v .  Eisnt>r. 245 l l .S .  4 1 8. 4:.!!"1 ( l !l 1 8 L 
I f ;(}_ S1•1• Med i n a .  suprn note R:!. at ! f1 4 :  
ThPn· is no rpason under t he s 1 1 n  wn:v a _j11dgl' should not nil\'(' h i s  l a w  dt•rk d rn l'I 
an opinion for his revision and approva l . nor is t hl• la\v apt lo sul l't'r in Hll_\' su hst n n l i n l  
1111•ns i 1 rl' if l hC' . iud gc•s arc• not ('onst nnt l�· st riving t n  c•m 1 1 l a l c• t ill' st \'lt• n f  n l l ol mt·s. n r  11 
l . 1•amc•d Hand or a Cardozo_ 
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The suggestion that judges are incapable of deciding for them­
selves or even that their judgments are unconsciously influenced by 
the clerks has always left a bad taste in my mouth. There is just 
something too Machiavellian about these ideas . In preparing my 
remarks I thought it might be interesting to see if Niccolo himself 
had anything to say on the question . I discovered an entire chapter, 
"Of the Secretaries of Princes, "  on the subject. I have already men­
tioned the idea that a good secretary reflects favorab ly on the pru­
dence of his prince. 16 1  But there are some more thoughts that for me 
are more than an ironic twist. They put an end to our delegation 
mqu1ry: 
There was nobody who knew Messer Antonio da Venafro as the minister 
of Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, who did not consider Pandolfo to be a 
very prudent man, having him for his minister. There are three different kinds 
of brains, the one understands things unassisted, the other understands things 
when shown by others, the third understands neither alone nor with the ex­
planations of others. The first kind is most excellent, the second also excellent, 
but the third useless. It is therefore evident that if Pandolfo was not of the first 
kind, he was at any rate of the second. For every time the prince has the 
judgment to know the good and evil that anyone does or says, even if he has 
no originality of intellect, yet he can recognize the bad and good works of his 
minister and correct the one and encourage the other; and the minister cannot 
hope to deceive him and therefore remains good. 182 
In my own experience Judge Gillis had the brain that under­
stands things unassisted, although he often let me believe he under­
stood better with my help .  And after working out all  these thoughts 
about delegation in my own mind I have come to respect him all the 
more for Judge Gillis was wise enough to strike out of the draft any 
incautious words sprinkled along the way. From my own year I am 
certain he always made the decisions . But of equal i m port, Judge 
Gillis's was always the pen of final judgment. Furthermore, I would 
accept it on faith that all judges are like Pandolfo; that as individu­
als they possess the essential qualities of their social office ; that they 
possess the good sense to recognize the bad and good work that their 
clerks do or write; and that all judges, like Judge Gillis for me, 
correct the one and encourage the other. 
And what of the clerk? Not only is he unable to deceive his 
161 .  See text accompanying note 6 1  supra. In his letter to the Times commenting on Professor Bi
_
ckel's article, see note 4 supra, Judge Hofstadter detailed the historic recedents for statf assistance: p 
Leonardo's students worked on his canvases· Dumas had h'  bl 1 · f h , 1s assem y me o co-au t ors; and Herbert Spencer drew on a group of collaborators A d E' t · d B h b ·1 · · · . n even ms em an o r u 1  t on the work of a host of research assistants. 1 62. N. MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 1 14 (Mentor ed. Ricci transl. 1952) .  
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judge, but I would add, he would not try. A good clerk knows good 
Jaw when he sees it ;  he recognizes that before good judgment there 
is the need for much hard thinking and that when j udgment finally 
comes its rationale m ust rise to the surface in a written opinion. I 
am sure, although you must accept this on faith too, that the clerk's 
work-be it recommendation, memo, or draft-will reflect these 
essential qualities of law itself, and that amidst all the explication 
there is hardly room for deception . Finally, I am convinced that 
those called to the institution bring to it the personal qualities of 
the good minister: 
For a prince to be able to know a minister there is this method which never 
fails. When you see the m inister think more of himself than of you, and in all 
his actions seek his own profit, such a man will never be a good minister, and 
you can never rely on h i m ;  for whoever has in hand the state of another must 
never think of hi mself but of the prince, and not mind anything but what 
relates to him. 1•• 
I for one woul d  accept the assertion that all clerks think only of their 
judges; and that the clerk, like his j udge, struggles daily to serve our 
own prince: the Law. 164 
APPENDIX 
The idea of a formal training program for law clerks was first 
given serious consi deration by several judges of the Louisiana 
Courts of Appeal,  Judges M .D. Miller and John T. Hood in particu­
lar. Originally the plan was to hold a conference for Louisiana's law 
clerks alone. J udge Lesinski, who eventually served as consultant to 
the first Law Clerk Institute, was exposed to the idea after meeting 
these judges at one of the yearly Appellate Judges Seminars . Judge 
Lesinski thought the idea of a workshop for clerks a sound one, and 
in his official capacity as Vice-Chairman of the Appellate Judges 
Conference and a mem ber of its Education Committee he contacted 
Associate Dean Francis Sullivan, of the Louisiana State University 
Law School ,  to plan for a national conference of prospective clerks. 
After several consultations with Judge Lesinski, the program for the 
first Institute was established and a prospectus was sent to appel­
late judges throughout the country, together with a schedule of fees. 
The response to the first Law Clerk Institute far exceeded the 
expectations of its planners. Notwithstanding a substantial fee per 
l (i:I. ld. al 1 1 4 - 1 5 .  
l fi4 . "The great est influence o f  these clerks. h y  nn<l large. hns hel'll ! he rnn• h u t  <l1·sirn· 
h i t· one of n•ll'nt. less scholarship." Newland. suprn note J :l . A l  :l l 7 .  
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registrant, almost 70 law clerks were sent by their judges to partici-
pate in the program. . 
The curriculum for the first Institute was spread over three 
days and consisted of the following subject areas . Faculty are listed 
in the adjacent column. 
Subject 
The Law Clerks: Profile of an 
Institution 
Judge and Clerk: Ethics of the 
Job 
Logic and Judicial Reasoning 
Working Tools, Appellate Struc­
tures, New Approaches 
English: Classical Structure and 
Style of Writing 
Opinion Writing 
Writing Exercise : Criti que of 
Draft Opinions 
Impact Decisions (3 faculty) 
Farn l t �' 
Paul R. Baier, Assi s t a n t  Proft>ssor of I .aw. Louisiana 
State University 
Honorable Albert Tate . Jr . .  Associat e  .Justice.  Lou isiana 
Supreme Court 
Honorable .Jack C. Day . . Judge, Ohio Court of Appeals 
N . O .  Stockmeyer .J r . ,  Resea rch Director. Mich igan 
Court of Appeals 
Dwight W.  Stevenson, Professor of English. College of 
Engineering, University of M ichigan 
Honorab l e  Robert T. M an n ,  .J udge, Florida Court of 
Appeal 
Paul R. Baier, Assist ant Professor of Law. Louisiana 
State University 
Honorable Albert Tate ,Jr., Associate .Justice. Louisiana 
Supreme Court 
Honorable William A. Grimes. Associate  .Justice, New 
Hampshire Supreme Court 
Cheney C. Joseph, Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana 
State University 
Except for the welcoming an d invocation addresses, each pres­
entation was intended to be informal ; the exchange of questions and 
answers between clerks and faculty was encouraged . The subjects 
were taught in small seminar rooms at the Louisiana State Univer­
sity Law Center, and because the number of registrants exceeded 
anticipated e nrollment, the clerks were split into two groups of 
about 30 each . Faculty schedules were then rearranged to require 
two classes per subject area in order to keep the sessions as small 
and informal as possible . 
An important part of the Institute was a writing exercise requir­
ing the clerks to prepare a draft judicial opinion in advance of the 
program .  The case used in the exercise was People v. Henley, 26 
Mich . App. 15,  182 N .W .2d 19 ( 1970) . Clerks were instructed to 
assume that they worked for the Michigan Court of Appeals on 
remand of the ap�eal from the Michigan Supreme Court, see People 
v .  Henley, 382 M ich. 143, 169 N .W.2d 299 ( 1969 ) ;  they were told to 
�repare a d�aft opinion in the case resolving the question of double 
.1eopard_Y raised on appeal by defendant Henley . A hypothetical trial 
transcript was sent to each clerk in advance of the Institute, to-
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gether with a collection of relevant research materials. No indepen­
dent research was required . Although the Henley appeal had been 
decided and an opinion was published in the case, the clerks were 
asked for pedagogical p urposes not to read the actual report until 
their own work was complete . These drafts were then critiqued as a 
portion of the lnstitute's program .  
Although t h e  work required t o  complete the writing exercise 
was substantial ,  more than 50 percent of the participants turned in 
their drafts before the program ,  reflecting a sincere desire to im­
prove clerkship performance. Although at times the critique session 
was hotly critical of some of these proposed opinions, the spirit was 
one of complete candor. All willingly participated, including those 
subject to the greatest criticism, again in the interest of upgrading 
performance of this important aspect of the clerk's function. 
During their three-day stay at the Institute, the law clerks were 
housed together as a group in Pleasant Hall,  a residence dormitory 
on the Louisiana State University campus near the Law Center. 
Two of the faculty, Justices Grimes and Tate, lived with the clerks 
during their stay in an effort to expose the new clerks, perhaps for 
the first time, to the i mportant conception of the j udge as human 
being, as well as j urist. Toward the same end, all the clerks, judges, 
and other faculty spent an informal evening together, beginning 
with a seafood b uffet and ending with much conversation between 
clerk and judge . 
At the conclusion of the program Judge Lesinski chaired a cri­
tique session a mong the Institute 's planners and faculty. Several 
judges of the Louisiana Courts of Appeal, who had been present as 
observers during the three days, also attended. It was the consensus 
that a sound beginning had been made and that the first effort 
proved worthwhile.  It was decided that the Institute should con­
tinue as an annual event. Suggestions for improvement of the pro­
gram in the future were tendered and discussed. 
Before leaving, each clerk was instructed to critique the pro­
gra m himself after actually working for a while as a clerk and to offer 
suggestions about reshaping the Institute's curriculum in the future. 
Although it is too early to report the reactions of the participati.ng 
clerks, some preliminary comments indicate that they too consid­
ered their time and effort well spent. In particular, one clerk wrote : 
" I  personally felt a good deal stronger in commencing my job the 
fol lowing week . " 
Throughout the program one theme was rei�erated. 
whenev�r 
poss ib le :  The law clerks are an institution. Hopefully wi t h  t hat 1 11 
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mind and with a sense of commitment to the traditions of the office 
the participating clerks set about their work, the Institute behind 
them, on a stronger footing. 
The following is a list of the courts represented at the first 
Institute . The listing is alphabetical by state, together with the 
names of judges who sent their clerks and the clerks' names. 
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Alabama 
As�u.:;atc ,Justice H1 1gh Maddox 
Supreme Court of Alabama 
,John W. Parker 
Associate .Justice Pelham .) . Merrill 
Supreme Court of Alabama 
Clellon K. Haeder 
Arizona 
Ch ief .Judge Herbert K rucker 
Court of Appeals, Div. 2 
Harley Kurlander 
.Judge .J a m es D .  Hathaway 
Court of Appea'is, Div. 2 
Robert M a ntiel 
.J udge Lawrence Howard 
Court of Appeals, Div.  2 
Phyllis Sugar 
Florida 
Associate .Justice Hal P .  Dekle 
Supreme Court of Florida 
M i chael Hastings 
C h ief .Judge Sam S pector 
1st Dist. Court of Appeal 
Cynthia Turnicliff 
.J udge ,Joh n  S. Rawls 
1st Dist. Court of Appeal 
Elaine Duggar 
C h i ef .Judge Thomas Barkdull ,  Jr. 
:Jrd Dist.  Court of Appeal 
Robert C. Markey 
I l linois 
. Just ice G lenn Seidenfeld 
Appellate Court, 2nd Dist. 
Laurence Templer 
.Just ice Harold Trapp 
Appellate Court, 4th Dist. 
Ann Rlandford 
.Just ice Caswell Crebs 
A ppellate Court, 5th Dist. 
Will iam Thomas 
.J ust ice George Moran 
A ppel late  Court, 5th Dist. 
Frank Mansfield 
Indiana 
Associate ,Justice Donald H. Hunter 
S u prem e  Court of Indiana 
David Gotshall 
Iowa 
Chief .Justice C. E. Moore 
Supreme Court of Iowa 
Bill O'Brien 
Kansas 
Chief Justice Harold R. Fatzer 
Supreme Court of Kansas 
Edwin P. Carpenter 
Associate Justice A.S.  Schroeder 
Supreme Court of Kansas 
Douglas C. Richards 
Kentucky 
Chief Justice Samuel Steinfeld 
Court of Appeals of Kentucky 
Max Schwartz 
James A. Bailey 
Associate Justice Scott Reed 
Court of Appeals of Kentucky 
Robert Walker 
Associate Justice John S. Palmore 
Court of Appeals of Kentucky 
Julia K. Tackett 
Louisiana 
Associate Justice John Dixon 
Supreme Court of Louisiana 
Robert Szabo 
Associate Justice Albert Tate, .Jr. 
Supreme Court of Louisiana 
Vance Andrus 
Todd Gremillion 
Judge Frederick El l is 
1st Circuit Court of Appeal 
Maurice LeGardeur 
,Judge C. Lenton Sartain 
1st Circuit Court of Appeal 
,James H. Morgan 
Judge H.W. Ayres 
2nd Circuit Court of Appeal 
.Jean T. Drew 
,Judge Pike Hall, .Jr. 
2nd Circuit Court of Appeal 
Edwin L. Cahra 
.Judge .Jesse Heard 
2nd Circuit Court of Appeal 
Alex Rubenstein 
,Judge O.E. Price 
2nd Circuit Court of Appeal 
Stephen Glassell 
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.Judge Minos D. Miller, Jr. 
�rd Circuit Court of Appeal 
Eugene Callaway 
,Judge ,James C. Gulotta 
4th Circuit Court of Appeal 
Kay K. Norman 
,Judge Harry T. Lemmon 
4th Circuit Court of Appeal 
Celeste Tanner 
,Judge Edward Stoulig 
4th Circuit Court of Appeal 
John R. Ates 
Judge L.C. Bertrand 
.Judge Douglas J. Nehrbass 
15th Judicial District Court 
Dale Martin 
Judge William T. Bennett 
20th ,Judicial District Court 
Phil Miley 
Judge Fred S. Bowes 
24th Judicial District Court 
Harry T. Hardin 
Judge Joseph A. LaHaye 
27th Judicial District Court 
Patrick Morrow 
Judge James C. Terrell 
30th Judicial District Court 
Fred Chevalier 
Michigan 
Chief Judge T. John Lesinski 
Court of Appeals 
Philip M. Stevens 
Judge John W .  Fitzgerald 
Court of Appeals 
Ernest Phillips 
Minnesota 
Associate .Justice Donald Peterson 
Supreme Court of Minnesota 
Burton Hanson 
Missouri 
Chief .Just.ice .James A. Finch, Jr. 
Supreme Court of Missouri 
Richard Brownlee 
Associate .Justice Robert T. Donnelly 
Su preme Court of Missouri 
Pat rick Dohert y  
Associate .Justice .Joseph .I. Si meone 
St . Louis Court of Appeals 
M a r�· Ann Weems 
Nevada 
Chief Justice David Zenoff 
Supreme Court of Nevada 
Sally S. Davis 
New Hampshire 
Chief Justice F .R.  Kenison 
Supreme Court of New Hampshire 
Charles Doleac 
New Mexico 
Associate Justice ,John B.  McMannus, .Jr. 
Supreme Court of New Mexico 
William Prim 
New York 
Judge Frank Del Vecchio 
Su preme Court, Appellate D ivision, 4th 
Dept. 
Mary Lou Crowley 
Oklahoma 
Judge Tom Brett 
Court of Criminal Appeals 
Penn Lerblanc 
Judge Robert D. S i ms 
Court of Criminal Appeals 
C. Michael Zacharias 
Rhode Island 
Chief Justice Thomas H. Roberts 
Supreme Court of Rhode Island 
Richard Licht 
Associate Justice A . H .  Joslin 
Supreme Court of Rhode Island 
Donald M iller 
Associate Justice Thomas Kel leher 
Supreme Court of Rhode Island 
Edward Radio 
Associate Justice Thomas Paolino 
Supreme Court of Rhode Island 
Angelica Bevilacqua 
Associate Justice Will iam E. Powers 
Supreme Court of Rhode Island 
Stephen Famglietti 
South Carolina 
Associate Justice J . M .  Brai lsford, .Jr .  
Supreme Court of South Carolina 
Kenneth Woodington 
Associate Justice Bruce Littlejohn 
Supreme Court of South Carolina 
Camden Lewis 
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Tennessee 
Judge Charles Galbreath 
Court of Criminal Appeals 
Will iam Bozeman 
Texas 
Chief .Judge .John Onion, .Jr. 
Court of Criminal Appeals 
Russell Busby 
Judge Leon Douglas 
Court of Criminal Appeals 
.John Drolla 
Judge W.A.  Morrison 
Court of Criminal Appeals 
Bertha S.  Ross 
.Judge Wendell A. Odom 
Court of Criminal Appeals 
G. Michael DeGeurin 
Judge Truman Roberts 
Court of Criminal Appeals 
David Cook 
Commissioner Carl E.F. Dally 
Court of Criminal Appeals 
Don Nelson 
Commissioner Thomas G. Davis 
Court of Criminal Appeals 
Herman Little 
United States Court of Appeals 
Chief Judge Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr. 
4th Circuit Court of Appeals 
James D. Myers 
1177 
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ition with some specifics. What harm to the judicial process to allow 
the clerk to state the facts? Any first-year student knows the facts 
are not the law. What harm to allow the clerk to state in a draft that 
the action is one ex contractu, o mitting Mrs. Quickly's details about 
the white hat and sea-coal fire? 156 Yet there is controversy even here. 
It was Justice Holmes himself, I think, who said that if permitted 
to state the facts, judgment in his favor would necessarily follow. 157 
Passing over this difficulty, think of the con_stitutional judgment 
implicit in the single word "penumbra . " 158 I know it was Justice 
Holmes who said that words are not like crystals, forever unchanged 
and transparent. A word "is the skin of a living thought. "1 59 And the 
thought may prove more law than literature. 
If all of what I have said is true, then as an abstract m atter as 
well as a day-to-day reality there would appear nothing wrong in the 
draftsmanship of the clerk, 1 60 provided the judge has the good sense 
to retouch the draft to eliminate any sentences or words not to his 
liking. And the retouching process is essential-it not only protects 
an individual interest in style, but it also guarantees the judge's 
fidelity to law. It determines whether the course of judicial duty will 
run straight and true. It is precisely here that one must abandon 
further analysis and rest final opinion on faith alone : can the judges 
be trusted to weed out any writing that smacks of judgment? 
l fi6 .  See O.W. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 168 
( 1 920) .  
J.57. Cf- Llewellyn, Law and the Modern Mind: A Symposium , 3 1  COLUM. L .  REv. 82, 
8:i ( 1 9:) 1 ) :  
The Judge's selection, stress and arrangement of "the facts" can m a ke the most 
peculiar case look l ike routine. We know from l i fe that most cases are, before this fact­
manipulation begins, peculiar. Manipulation-nay, perception-of "the facts" is all­
i mportant.; j udges, like witnesses, observe d ifferently according to temperament and 
circumstances_ Judges read the evidence they get with an eye to their views of just ice: 
"t he facts" t.ake shape in court in the light. of the resu lt to he achieved. 
Perhaps the i m portance of this fact perception is what .Judge Medina of t h e  Second 
C ircu i t  had in m i n d  when he explained his refusal to allow his clerks to st a t e the far t s  on 
a ppl'a l :  "I do not believe [ th a t l  is the kind of t h ing you can turn over t o  a law dt>rk who 
has not had ex perience appraising facts." Medina, The /)ecisinnnl f'rnC'I'-'" in th 1 • I !nit 1 ·d 
Stal l's Co u rt of A pp1•als, Second Circu it-Ho11• the Whel'ls (;11 f{u u n d  lnsid1· ·- ll' il h  
Cr111w1 1•n tnrv. Address before New York Coun ty Lawyers' Associat ion Foru m E\'C'n i ng. Apr.  
:.!Ii. l !lli2 ( t y;iPwri t t en ) , at 22,  qu11t1•d in M .  SCHICK, .mprn not e I Hi. nt I O!i. 
l f1H_ 81•1• Cri swolcl v .  Conncc t i rn t ,  :lR I U .S .  479. 4H4 ( Wfif >l .  
l fi!I_ Towne v .  Eisnt>r. 245 l l .S .  4 1 8. 4:.!!"1 ( l !l 1 8 L 
I f ;(}_ S1•1• Med i n a .  suprn note R:!. at ! f1 4 :  
ThPn· is no rpason under t he s 1 1 n  wn:v a _j11dgl' should not nil\'(' h i s  l a w  dt•rk d rn l'I 
an opinion for his revision and approva l . nor is t hl• la\v apt lo sul l't'r in Hll_\' su hst n n l i n l  
1111•ns i 1 rl' if l hC' . iud gc•s arc• not ('onst nnt l�· st riving t n  c•m 1 1 l a l c• t ill' st \'lt• n f  n l l ol mt·s. n r  11 
l . 1•amc•d Hand or a Cardozo_ 
